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ABSTRACT 
In this Article, I argue that we should understand #BlackLivesMatter as a claim on 
the Constitution—a very special kind of constitutional claim, on the Constitution as 
fundamental law. It is a paradigmatic contemporary example of this category of 
constitutional law for citizens, one that reaches back past the roots of the American 
Revolution and underlies the logic of popular sovereignty at the core of our system. 
Section I develops a conceptual sketch of fundamental law and its features. Section 
II then turns to the content of “Black Lives Matter” as a constitutional principle and 
traces its position in the arc of Black constitutional thought, from the emancipatory 
protestantism of Frederick Douglass to the provocations of Judge Bruce Wright and 
beyond. Section III explains why this principle matches the features of fundamental 
law and why it matters—developing the idea of the “constitutional bases of respect” 
and exploring the consequences of “Black Lives Matter” as a mediating principle in 
several areas of constitutional doctrine. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A few years ago, I lived in Brooklyn. Whenever I went to the 
grocery store, I would pass by the intersection of Fulton Street and 
Marcy Avenue, in the Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood. At the 
northeast corner, along Marcy Avenue, there was a large, breathtaking 
mural featuring the Preamble to the Constitution.1 Though the mural is 
no longer there, I can still see it plainly in my mind’s eye. Next to this 
ornate calligraphy of the Preamble are three figures, looking out 
proudly at the passers-by with the Pan-African flag flowing behind 
them. One is Thurgood Marshall, who led the NAACP’s legal effort to 
topple racial segregation and served as the nation’s first Black 
Supreme Court Justice.2 To Justice Marshall’s left, in a pin-striped 
suit, is Paul Robeson, an entertainer and activist who protested 
apartheid in the American South and in South Africa and was 
blacklisted for his socialist views.3 Closest to the Preamble is another 
black-robed figure, Judge Bruce Wright, whom I had never heard of 
before this mural seized my attention. 
                                                 
1 975 Marcy Ave – GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com 
[https://perma.cc/2VYT-XP32] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018) (enter “966 Marcy 
Avenue Brooklyn New York” into search); I have also reproduced a photograph 
(taken by the author) below; see also Beth Stebner, The Murals on the Wall in 
Bed-Stuy: New Exhibition Examines Nabe’s History Through Public Art, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (Feb. 4, 2014), www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/brooklyn/murals-walls-bed-stuy-exhibition-article-1.1602030 
[https://perma.cc/J2Z7-7ALX]. Sadly, the mural was painted over sometime in 
the summer of 2016. 
2 Of course, Marshall’s work continued in the wake of others’ contributions. The 
architect of the NAACP’s strategy was Charles Hamilton Houston, who oversaw 
the organization’s transformation from first-responder to cases like the 
Scottsboro Boys trial to the legal vanguard in a comprehensive campaign against 
Jim Crow. For a thorough discussion of the evolution of this strategy, see MARK 
V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED 
EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (2005). 
3 Robeson was perhaps most famous for his rendition of “Ol’ Man River,” but his 
contributions as a public intellectual were especially significant on the political 
Left and in the African-American community during the middle of the twentieth 
century. For a collection of Robeson’s works, letters, and speeches, see PAUL 
ROBESON SPEAKS (Philip S. Foner ed., 1978). Robeson graduated from 
Columbia Law School, and his undergraduate thesis in 1919 was an encomium 
to the Fourteenth Amendment’s potential, borrowing Charles Sumner’s words, 
as a “Sleeping Giant.” Id. at 53-62. 
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Atop the mural is a signature in white that reads “NY Justice Corps 
2009,” a group that provides opportunities to young people released 
from prison. One component of this program is community service, 
which includes creating neighborhood murals such as this one.4 Just 
one block to the east along Tompkins Avenue, there is a similar mural 
that honors a train of deceased cultural icons, from Redd Foxx to the 
Notorious B.I.G. It is easy to imagine why a young adult might choose 
to depict these heroes as pillars of black culture and a testament to its 
impact on our nation. But one might wonder why this artist—whose 
life prospects will likely be forever burdened by the weighty racial 
disparities of the American criminal justice system—chose instead to 
celebrate the Constitution as a symbol of self-empowerment and a 
source of self-respect. 
 
 
 
After the lofty language of the Preamble, Article I of the original 
Constitution apportioned Representatives according to “the whole 
number of free persons” and three-fifths of all “other persons”—the 
chattel slaves at the base of the South’s social and economic 
structures. 5  Ta-Nehesi Coates evocatively traces the roots of mass 
                                                 
4 For discussion of the program, see Amelia Thompson & Debbie Mukamal, NYC 
Justice Corps Making Difference, RE-THINKING REENTRY, 
rethinkingreentry.blogspot.com/2009/12/nyc-justice-corps-making-
difference.html [https://perma.cc/B3MH-LF39]. 
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. Note that this three-fifths calculation enhanced and 
entrenched Southern power in the House and the Electoral College through the 
first half of the nineteenth century. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005). 
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incarceration to Article IV’s original requirement that fugitive 
“[p]erson[s] held to Service or Labour” be rendered to slave states, so 
that “[b]lack criminality is literally written into the American 
Constitution.” 6  Even after emancipation under the Thirteenth 
Amendment,7 the Constitution appeared to remain compatible with a 
system of racial apartheid for almost a century. And even with the 
gains of the Civil Rights Revolution, the constitutional text itself has 
not stemmed the tide of America’s continuing legacy of White 
Supremacy. 8  The artist might well have wondered whether black 
citizens have ever been fully included in those three colossal words, 
“We the People.”9 
Around the same time I frequented this particular corner of Bed-
Stuy, the country was roiled by a series of events that sparked protest 
in communities across the country. On November 25, 2014, a grand 
jury in Ferguson, Missouri declined to indict Officer Darren Wilson 
for the murder of Michael Brown, finding that there was insufficient 
evidence to question Wilson’s testimony that he acted in self-
defense.10 A later investigation by the Department of Justice would 
corroborate this finding, but it illuminated the context that generated 
such outrage, a pervasive pattern of egregiously discriminatory 
policing.11 The following week, a Staten Island grand jury similarly 
refused to indict an officer for killing Eric Garner, despite a video 
recording of the breath leaving Garner’s body as Officer Pantaleo held 
him by the neck and four other officers pinned him to the ground. 
                                                 
6 Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Black Family in the Age of Mass Incarceration, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Oct. 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/10/the-black-family-in-the-
age-of-mass-incarceration/403246/ [https://perma.cc/8M2B-JKXE]. 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
8 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010). 
9 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
10 For discussion of the events, see What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 10, 2015), www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-
missouri-town-under-siege-after-police-shooting.html [http://perma.cc/4QAY-
9H87]. 
11 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE 
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CLL3-JL8X]. 
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Ongoing demonstrations in Ferguson erupted in a wave of protest 
across the country, capturing a moment in the national consciousness 
with a simple, arresting phrase: “Black Lives Matter.”12 Since then, we 
have uncovered the callous violence that killed Freddie Gray.13 We 
have witnessed the senseless murders of Walter Scott in North 
Charleston and Ronald Johnson in Chicago, burned into our public 
consciousness and etched into the permanent memory of the internet.14 
We have engaged in a robust public debate about the lingering cancer 
of White Supremacy in our criminal justice system, mediated by this 
central claim that Black Lives—their lives—Matter. 
These three resonant words do more than express indignation at the 
refusal to indict two police officers. They insist that we value a black 
person’s life the same as any other human life. They demand 
recognition of the difference15 in black lives, in the lived experience of 
structural discrimination and subordination. Pregnant in these three 
plaintive words—in their very need to be uttered—is the implication 
that our institutions do not treat black lives as though they matter 
equally. They bespeak the profound alienation of Black citizens from 
the criminal justice system. They underline its injustices. And, I want 
to suggest, these words and others like them can also be understood as 
                                                 
12 A recent paper by Amna Akbar describes the Movement for Black Lives, 
detailing its founding events, formational conversations, and development of 
these urgent claims and demands into a coherent vision. See Amna A. Akbar, 
Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 417-19, 423-24, 
427-32 (2018). Philosopher Chris Lebron has ably plumbed the conceptual 
foundations of the movement and its claims in CHRISTOPHER J. LEBRON, THE 
MAKING OF BLACK LIVES MATTER: A BRIEF HISTORY OF AN IDEA (2017). 
13 Peter Hermann & John Woodrow Cox, A Freddy Gray Primer: Who Was He, 
How Did He Die, Why Is There so Much Anger?, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2015/04/28/a-freddie-gray-
primer-who-was-he-how-did-he-why-is-there-so-much-
anger/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9a651fb19d53 [https://perma.cc/U2S9-
X8A2]. 
14 Id.; see also Steve Schmadeke & Jason Meisner, Ronald Johnson Shooting 
Death; Lawyer Blasts Decision, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 7, 2015), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-ronald-johnson-video-20151207-
story.html [http://perma.cc/2M73-KDNS]. 
15 Cf. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 3 (1990) 
(arguing “that where social group differences exist and some groups are 
privileged while others are oppressed, social justice requires explicitly 
acknowledging and attending to those group differences in order to undermine 
oppression.”). 
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claims on the Constitution.16 In this paper, I argue that we should 
understand #BlackLivesMatter as a claim on the Constitution—a very 
special kind of constitutional claim, on the Constitution as 
fundamental law. It is a paradigmatic contemporary example of this 
category of constitutional law for citizens,17 one that reaches back past 
the roots of the American Revolution and underlies the logic of 
popular sovereignty at the core of our system. Section I develops a 
conceptual sketch of fundamental law and its features. Section II then 
turns to the content of “Black Lives Matter” as a constitutional 
principle. Section III explains why this principle matches the features 
of fundamental law and why it matters—developing the idea of the 
“constitutional bases of respect” and exploring the consequences of 
“Black Lives Matter” as a mediating principle in several areas of 
constitutional doctrine. 
But first, back to the mural for a moment. If we can understand 
“Black Lives Matter” as a claim of fundamental law—whereby Black 
citizens claim the Constitution for themselves—then we can solve the 
puzzle of the mural’s subject matter: why a formerly-incarcerated 
artist might celebrate the U.S. Constitution and the luminaries of Black 
constitutional thought who have shaped its meaning. This is not so 
puzzling after all: the Constitution depicted in the mural does not 
countenance the lingering institutions of White Supremacy. It is, 
                                                 
16  For a deeper doctrinal dive into the question of whether Black Lives Matter to 
the Constitution, see Bruce Miller, Constitutional Law—Do Black Lives Matter 
to the Constitution? 40 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 459 (2018). 
17  I mean to deploy the concept of “citizenship” broadly, to include all members of 
the political community. This more capacious definition will include, in 
principle, all adults with the capacity to participate in political life. The 
Fourteenth Amendment, of course, requires that “[a]ll persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST.  
amend. XIV, § 1. Beyond that floor, who may serve as a voter and a juror is 
largely a question of state law. A California Bill (ultimately vetoed in October 
2013) would have extended jury service to noncitizens. See Andrew Guthrie 
Ferguson, Why Restrict Jury Duty to Citizens?, ATLANTIC (May 9, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/05/why-restrict-jury-duty-to-
citizens/275685/ [http://perma.cc/2Q69-ZZD4]. Other interpretive role 
responsibilities of citizenship, such as deliberative discussion or civil 
disobedience, are not a function of positive law but emanate instead from that 
more capacious and moral idea of membership in the political community. I 
believe this includes, although I do not argue for it here, undocumented 
immigrants.  
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instead, the Constitution as claimed by Black citizens—interpreted 
through a process of radical self-inclusion, dedicated to the 
Reconstruction of our polity. This interpretive approach, what I will 
call emancipatory protestantism, follows a trail first blazed by 
Frederick Douglass in effort to claim the Constitution and imbue it 
with justice. 
The mural tells the story of successive interpreters who carried on 
Douglass’s emancipatory protestantism, participating in a robust 
tradition of Black constitutional thought. The interpretive claims that 
have flourished in this tradition are at once radical and firmly 
grounded in the document’s deepest aspirations of justice and 
inclusion. Together, these protestant claims form a rich tapestry, 
woven across the generations. And in advancing these claims, the 
artists of the mural and fellow citizen interpreters thereby claim the 
Constitution as their own. #BlackLivesMatter is only the latest such 
claim, and understanding it as a claim of fundamental law illustrates 
why that category of constitutional law for citizens is so vital. 
The claim that Black Lives Matter sounds in a variety of registers: 
as a salvo against police brutality, an indictment of a broken criminal 
justice system, and a demand for recognition of Black Americans’ 
basic human rights.18 Certainly, many members of the movement have 
intended those resonant meanings, and I do not wish to speak for them, 
condescend to them, or purport to explain what their claims really 
mean. The perspective from which I write is that of a citizen and a 
participant in the national conversation, one who seeks to take the 
claim that Black Lives Matter seriously. I argue that there is a parallel 
and complementary register in which, as citizens, we should 
understand the claim that Black Lives Matter as a claim on the 
Constitution. 
Members of the Black Lives Matter movement might 
understandably wish to turn their backs to constitutional discourse. 
But, if my arguments are correct, they provide reasons not to simply 
reject the Constitution as composed of wrong-headed, judge-made law. 
The fundamental law of the Constitution belongs to its citizens, and by 
invoking its principles, they perform an act of radical self-inclusion. 
Our Constitution—the Constitution of today, rather than the document 
of 1789—was forged on the battlefields of the Civil War as much as a 
convention hall in Philadelphia. It is the precipitate of an ongoing 
                                                 
18 See discussion accompanying and sources cited infra notes 84-88. 
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project whereby citizens imbue the principles of their fundamental law 
with their conception of justice, and that Constitution is capacious 
enough to take aim at the structures of White Supremacy. 
II. THE IDEA OF FUNDAMENTAL LAW 
The notion of fundamental law—as mid-twentieth century 
historian and philosopher J.W. Gough defines it, law that “cannot be 
altered or repealed by ordinary legislative procedure”19—is quite an 
old idea. Gough traces the concept to historical antecedents in Lord 
Coke’s famous dictum in Dr. Bonham’s Case and the Levellers’ 
professions of popular sovereignty during the English Civil War.20 
Historians such as Larry Kramer and Gordon Wood detail the 
significant influence of these precedents over the American 
Revolution, as well as the American innovation of fundamental law as 
embodied in a written Constitution.21 For the purposes of this Article, 
which has as its aim to understand the kind of constitutional claim that 
“Black Lives Matter” might be, we can begin by identifying certain 
key features of fundamental law in hopes of developing a working 
notion of the concept. 
A. Conceptual Sketch of Fundamental Law 
Fundamental law is, in a sense, both deeper than and prior to its 
most salient contrast, ordinary law.22 Ranging from traffic ordinances 
to complex regulatory schemes, provisions of ordinary law seek to 
provide action-guidance for the parties bound by its rules. Ordinary 
                                                 
19 J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 2 
(1955). Interestingly (and relatedly) Gough was also a scholar of Locke and 
other contemporaneous social contract theorists. Theoretical questions about 
American judicial review are very much in the background, with the book’s 
publication one year after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
20 See GOUGH, supra note 19. 
21 See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004), who characterizes the 
category of as “political-legal;” see also SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1990); SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL (1990); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten 
Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. 
L. REV. 843 (1978). 
22 GOUGH, supra note 19, at 2. 
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law is specific, predictable, and firmly settled by authoritative 
institutions such as courts.23 By contrast, the domain of fundamental 
law contains far more controversy—a function of citizens’ capacity to 
apprehend (and disagree about) its meaning through their common 
reason. 
Fundamental law is an old idea, and its proponents have long 
drawn a distinction not just with ordinary law, but also with natural 
law—understood as a kind of universal reason whose principles are 
binding on all of humankind, without regard to the positive enactments 
of any particular jurisdiction.24  Whereas natural law emanates from 
general reason and pure abstraction, claims of fundamental law apply 
to (and through) the extant institutions of positive law. Historian 
Suzanna Sherry thus aptly describes the concept of fundamental law in 
the pre-constitutional era as a kind of “custom mediated by reason.”25 
Basic principles of fundamental law are part of what constitutes a 
system of institutions. 26  Examples abound throughout our history. 
                                                 
23 Id. 
24 In the debate over constitutional ratification, Antifederalist author Federal 
Farmer draws this same tripartite distinction in cataloguing different categories 
of rights. First are natural rights, “which even the people cannot deprive 
individuals.” By contrast, “constitutional or fundamental [rights] . . . cannot be 
altered or abolished by the ordinary laws; but the people, by express acts, may 
alter or abolish them—These, such as the trial by jury, the benefits of the writ of 
habeas corpus, &c. individuals claim under the solemn compacts of the people, 
as constitutions, or at least under laws so strengthened by long usage as not to be 
repealable by the ordinary legislature.” Letter from Federal Farmer No. 6 (Dec. 
25, 1787), in HERBERT J. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, 1, at 261 
(1981). Finally, ordinary law denotes “common or mere legal rights, that is, such 
as individuals claim under laws which the ordinary legislature may alter or 
abolish at pleasure.” Id. 
25 Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1127, 1130 (1987). 
26 Gough quotes a memorable passage from an anonymous Leveller pamphleteer 
in 1643: “Fundamental laws are not (or at least need not be) any written 
agreement like meare-stones [boundary markers] between king and people, the 
king himself being a part (not party) in those Laws, and the Commonwealth not 
being like a corporation created by charter, but creating itself.” As such, 
fundamental laws cannot be “things of capitulation between king and people as 
if they were foreigners and strangers one to another” but rather “things of 
constitution, creating such a relation, and giving such an existence and being . . . 
to king and subjects, as head and members.” As a result, the fundamental law 
that gives rise to a constitutional system “is a law held forth with more evidence 
and written in the very heart of the Republique, far firmlyer than can be by pen 
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Long before the American Constitution, the Parliament issued the 
English Bill of Rights of 1689, “vindicating and asserting their ancient 
rights and liberties” by “declar[ing]” the fundamentals listed by Penn, 
as well as several other antecedents for Madison’s proposals. 27 
Fundamental law also appeared in the courts, as with Lord Coke’s 
famous invocation of the principle in Dr. Bonham’s Case, that “no 
man  can be judge in his own case.”28 In 1761, colonial lawyer James 
Otis cited Lord Coke’s example for the proposition that “an Act of 
Parliament against common justice or common right is void,” 
condemning the Writs of Assistance as “against the fundamental 
principles of law” ensuring that “a man who is quiet is as secure in his 
house as a prince in his castle.”29 
In a diary entry from 1771, John Adams claimed that though the 
“general rules of law and common regulations of society, under which 
ordinary transactions arrange themselves, are well enough known” to 
citizens in their capacity as jurors,30 the fundamental law was even 
more palpably understood. “The great principles of the constitution are 
intimately known; they are sensibly felt by every Briton; it is scarcely 
extravagant to say they are drawn in and imbibed with the nurse’s milk 
and first air.”31 Though these principles are readily accessible, that 
very proximity to citizens’ common reason serves to invite and ignite 
ongoing interpretive argument. Indeed, the fundamental law of a 
constitution plays the distinctive role of grounding political 
disagreements. Founding era figure Joel Barlow, in his counsel to the 
French in the formation of their own constitution of 1791, stressed the 
                                                                                                                   
and paper.” GOUGH, supra note 19, at 100-02 (emphasis added) (quoting 
Touching the Fundamental Laws (1643)). 
27 See Bill of Rights 1689: An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the 
Subject and Settling the Succession of the Crown (Eng.), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp [https://perma.cc/ZU7X-
LKUC]. For a fascinating visualization of the documents that informed the 
language of the Bill of Rights—both Madison’s proposals and in the various 
drafts along the way—, see Writing Rights: The Bill of Rights, NAT’L CONST. 
CTR., http://constitutionalrights.constitutioncenter.org/app/home/writing 
[https://perma.cc/TW7J-LXRD] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018). 
28 GOUGH, supra note 19, at 33. 
29 Id. at 192 & n.2; see also KRAMER, supra note 21, at 21-23 (discussing John 
Adams’ contemporaneous notes of Otis’s argument and their application to 
revolutionary-era constitutional debate). 
30 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1850). 
31 Id. (emphasis added). 
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difference between a “constitutional code, and other occasional 
laws.”32 Like the American charter, they should strive to render the 
French constitution 
as simply expressed and easy to be understood as 
possible; for it ought to serve not only as a guide to the 
legislative body, but as a political grammar to all the 
citizens. The greatest service . . . [of] it is, that it should 
concentrate the maxims, and form the habits of 
thinking, for the whole community.33 
The Constitution, as fundamental law, is the citizens’ document. As 
citizens continue to interpret and deliberate together about what it 
means, the Constitution endures. In James Wilson’s memorable 
phrase, for the sovereign people, the Constitution’s meaning is “clay in 
the hands of the potter.”34  
The prevailing literature discussing citizens’ role in interpreting 
fundamental law orbits around two particular clusters—the theory of 
“popular constitutionalism” 35  and accounts of social movements’ 
impact on constitutional law.36 My contribution is distinctive in three 
respects. First, most of these accounts—especially the work of 
historians describing fundamental law in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries—lack a coherent theory of the concept of 
                                                 
32 Joel Barlow, A Letter to the National Convention of France on the Defects in the 
Constitution of 1791 (1792), in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE 
FOUNDING ERA, 1760-1805, at 823 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S Lutz eds., 
1983). 
33 Id. 
34 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 712 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David 
Hall, eds., 2007). Despite famous skepticism about any particular institution 
standing in for the people-at-large, Publius also subscribes to the notion that the 
people themselves are not only capable of interpreting fundamental law, but 
uniquely so. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison) (“the people 
themselves . . . can alone declare its true meaning, and enforce its observance”). 
35 See generally KRAMER, supra note 21. 
36 See DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY (2016); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe 
Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
373 (2007); Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a 
Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L. J. 2740 (2014); 
Akbar, supra note 12. 
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fundamental law. 37  Second, my conception of fundamental law 
emphasizes the role responsibilities of individual citizens—as voters 
and jurors, deliberators and civil disobedients—not just as diffuse 
members of social movements and the body politic. 38  Finally, 
prevailing accounts of constitutional politics and popular 
constitutionalism understand citizens’ interpretive participation as 
merely engaging in bare-knuckle politics—and nothing more.39 This 
conception of popular constitutionalism fails to register the 
Constitution’s status as law, and it cynically misperceives citizens’ 
genuine engagement in interpreting constitutional principles. 
On my account, fundamental law is constitutional law that is 
primarily for citizens to interpret. It consists of shared principles, 
which are beyond the power of institutions to alter, that are efficacious 
in spite of disagreement over controversial application. We can say 
that a principle is efficacious when it is capable of robustly serving as 
a medium for (possibly competing) arguments that generate coherence 
in the body of legal materials and appeal to citizens’ common reason. 
This Article is not the place to fully articulate a full theory of 
fundamental law, which I develop and defend elsewhere.40 Instead, my 
aim is to provide an adequate sketch of the concept. We can then use 
                                                 
37 See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 21, at 14 (“Between its diverse sources, fluid 
nature, and the absence of any centralized forum for resolving conflict, 
fundamental law tended to be ‘whatever could be plausibly argued and forcibly 
maintained.’”) (quoting John Phillip Reid, In a Defensive Rage: The Uses of the 
Mob, the Justification in Law, and the Coming of the American Revolution, 49 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1043, 1087 (1974)). 
38 David McNamee, The Citizens’ Constitution (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
39 Mark Tushnet’s case for “taking the Constitution away from the courts” rests on 
a political calculation of cost and benefit. “Populist constitutional law returns 
constitutional law to the people, acting through politics,” and it does so by 
understanding the judiciary in an equally political light. MARK TUSHNET, 
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 186 (1999). “Judicial 
review in the United States is, by design, connected to ordinary politics.” 
Through the mobilization of interest groups and partisan contestation, “[t]he 
nomination and confirmation process is political to the very ground. . . . The 
effect is to bring judicial review into alignment with politics elsewhere.” Id. at 
152. As a result, judicial review “cannot be defended except by seeing how it 
operates” — in other words, the resulting policy outcomes. Id. See also Mark 
Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHI.- KENT L. Rev. 
991 (2006). 
40 See McNamee, supra note 38. 
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that theoretical scaffolding to achieve two purposes: first, to 
understand the claim that “Black Lives Matter” in a new light; and 
second, to illustrate the notion of principles of fundamental law by 
considering that urgent claim as a paradigm case. By working through 
this example and its historical antecedents, we can shed light on the 
values that fundamental law promotes—generating the constitutional 
bases of citizens’ respect and grounding their pervasive disagreements 
over political morality. 
To that end, I will now simply list several conceptual formulations 
of the idea of fundamental law. I take the following statements to be 
roughly equivalent, building upon one another: 
 
Several Formulations of Fundamental Law: 
1. “constitutional law for citizens to continue to argue about” 
2. “the most vital provisions and principles of the Constitution” 
3. “basic constitutional principles accessible to citizens’ common 
reason” 
4. “the basis for public reason about shared constitutional values, 
grounding disagreements” 
5. “a contestatory resource for citizens to vindicate their rights 
and challenge injustice, by claiming the Constitution” 
Formulation (1) is perhaps the most elementary: fundamental law 
is for citizens to interpret, in the first instance as well as in the last. 
Unlike ordinary law, the fully-particularized meaning of its principles 
cannot be settled, at least in any final sense, by authoritative 
institutions. Formulation (2) stresses that fundamental law does not 
include all of the Constitution—not, for example, its mechanical rules 
or the accretion of intricate and technical doctrine. Rather, 
fundamental law makes up the most vital provisions and principles of 
constitutional law: its accessible text, its animating structure, and the 
landmark cases that fill the terrain of our constitutional history. 
Formulations (3) through (5) explain why these provisions and 
principles are what matter most. Citizens may reason about them, not 
only as individuals, but together as participants in a common 
enterprise. And in so doing, they lay claim to the Constitution and take 
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responsibility for it, for the justice it seeks41 and the grievous failures 
that demand redemption.42 
B. Provisions and Principles of Fundamental Law 
Many constitutional provisions are open-textured and lack 
specificity, invoking abstract principles.43 Some examples include the 
Eighth Amendment’s provision against “cruel and unusual 
punishment,” the standard of “high crimes and misdemeanors” 
governing impeachment, and the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee 
against excessive or “unreasonable” force. They also encompass the 
unifying purposes of the Preamble that pervade our political discourse. 
Determining the proper meaning and application of these provisions 
requires substantial interpretive argument and moral disagreement. 
Of course, this does not mean that the Constitution settles nothing 
at all or that it avoids specific language entirely. Unmistakably, many 
other provisions are hard-wired rules, such as the equal representation 
of states in the Senate, the fixed qualifications for who may serve as a 
Representative, or the procedures for the Electoral College. As 
Christopher Eisgruber observes, establishing institutions for 
democratic self-government requires some degree of specificity, detail, 
and settlement.44 Otherwise, “[i]f a polity is consumed with endless 
debates about how to structure its basic [] institutions, it will be unable 
to formulate policy” or govern itself in any way.45 This is a powerful 
democratic argument for constitutional entrenchment. By answering 
these procedural questions and removing them from the domain of 
political argument, constitutional specificity makes democratic 
decision making possible. 
                                                 
41 See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004). 
42 See JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION (2010). 
43 See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW 7-12 (2005); CHRISTOPHER L. 
EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 2-3, 35, 40-42 (Harvard 
Univ. Press ed. 2007). See also JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 256-73 
(2011) (discussing the relationship between constitutional text, at varying levels 
of generality and abstraction, and constitutional principles as an argumentative 
resource); SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 246-51 (2011) 
(distinguishing between “the Constitution of Conversation” and “the 
Constitution of Settlement”). 
44 EISGRUBER, supra note 43, at 12-35. 
45 Id. at 13. 
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But there is an important corollary here. Eisgruber notes that the 
fixed, entrenched nature of these specific provisions means that they 
cannot (and, as we have just seen, do not) exhaust all that there is to 
the constitutional text. Constitutions must also include broader 
provisions and abstract concepts that adapt to different circumstances 
and whose meaning in those circumstances remains open for debate. 
Otherwise, constitutional self-government would freeze in brittle, 
crystalline form.46 The result is that the more general provisions and 
abstract principles of the Constitution are not there by coincidence—
they necessarily mark out our most important commitments and 
aspirations as a people. Whatever else is settled by the Constitution, 
the proper application of these abstract principles must remain an open 
question for ongoing interpretive argument.47 That is what makes these 
principles the most fundamental provisions and features of the 
Constitution. 
Many sophisticated adherents of originalism also accept this 
distinction between the Constitution’s abstract clauses and its more 
concrete provisions. 48  For the abstract clauses, Jack Balkin 
distinguishes between constitutional meaning and the “original 
expected application” of that meaning. In this way, Balkin aims to 
reconcile originalism with living constitutionalism, creating theoretical 
                                                 
46 Id. at 35 (“[O]ne benefit of inflexible amendment procedures is that they provide 
reformers with an incentive to refrain from constitutionalizing too many specific 
judgments. And although it seems obvious that citizens can never get down to 
the business of policy-making if they are always arguing about how to count the 
votes, it is far from clear that there is any comparable disadvantage to an 
ongoing, durable argument about (for example) what equality requires. On the 
contrary, sustained public argument about the meaning of equality and other 
ideals might plausibly be regarded as the essence of democracy.”). One 
objection to this line of argument is to distinguish procedure from substance; 
see, for example, the brief tour of the Constitution in JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 88 (2002). But this maneuver invariably fails—
procedural phrases are also necessarily abstract, and they ultimately rest on 
substantive ideas. 
47 Eisgruber agrees. EISGRUBER, supra note 43, at 40 (“[W]e should interpret the 
Constitution’s ambiguous moral and political concepts as requiring Americans 
to exercise their own best judgment about the matters to which those concepts 
refer.”). Eisgruber’s defense of judicial review (with which I am sympathetic) is 
that, by representing the people on matters of principle, it facilitates this 
enterprise. See id. at 42. But, like Dworkin, his account is too court-focused. 
48 See supra discussion accompanying note 43. 
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space for the ongoing political project of constitutional construction.49 
Ronald Dworkin also makes a similar move at several points in his 
defense of a “moral reading” of the Constitution.50 He suggests that 
interpreters should pay particular attention to the deliberate selection 
of general and abstract terms, especially as they invite moral judgment 
about citizens’ basic rights.51 Eisgruber extends Dworkin’s argument 
in his proceduralist defense of judicial review, suggesting that judges 
with life tenure are particularly well-suited to represent the people on 
these matters of moral principle.52 
But there is a kind of lacuna here, especially with regard to the 
proponents of Dworkinian judicial review. Each of these views 
correctly traces the distinct category of fundamental law, but the 
emphasis quickly pivots to the role of courts in interpreting these 
abstract moral clauses.53 And, of course, judges must play that role—
but to place this responsibility with judges first and foremost 
misunderstands the conceptual foundations of our constitutional order. 
In my account of fundamental law, I aim to draw attention to the 
critical role that citizens must play in interpreting these provisions, as 
well as the value of their interpretive participation. Indeed, this notion 
is implicit in Dworkin’s view. The Citizens’ Constitution widens the 
scope of Dworkin’s “forum of principle,” for the very reasons that he 
prizes the democratic role of the judiciary: that their public articulation 
                                                 
49 See BALKIN, supra note 43, as a reconciliation between originalism and living 
constitutionalism. See also William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 
COLUM. L. Rev. 2349 (2015) (discussing “inclusive originalism”); Lawrence B. 
Solum, Semantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers 
Series, Working Paper No. 07-24). 
50 See DWORKIN, supra note 43. 
51 Id.; McNamee, supra note 38. Chapter 1 also articulates a substantive 
conception of democracy as securing the basic rights of free and equal 
citizenship, contra the “majoritarian premise.” Id. 
52 EISGRUBER, supra note 43, at 3-4. 
53 This is less so for Balkin, who clearly appreciates the central role of 
constitutional citizenship, even if their role remains somewhat passive. The 
theory still trains significant focus on the “legitimating” function of the 
judiciary. See BALKIN, supra note 42. Dworkin frequently pays lip service to the 
idea of citizen interpretation, but this discussion is often divorced from the 
Constitution. The notable exception is his discussion of civil disobedience 
grounded in protestant constitutional interpretation. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 206-22 (1978). But even there, Dworkin’s focus remains 
fixed on the official decisions of whether to prosecute civil disobedience. 
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of principles will elevate constitutional discourse for every participant 
in the legal system. As Dworkin says, the forum of principle “holds 
out the promise that the deepest, most fundamental conflicts between 
individual and society will once, someplace, finally, become questions 
of justice.”54 On my view, this is the promise that fundamental law (at 
least our fundamental law) holds out—for all of us, as self-governing 
citizens. And this explains, in a way that Dworkin never quite did, why 
a Constitution predicated on popular sovereignty is special. 
So much for the Constitution’s abstract provisions—what do I 
mean by including “principles” as well? Again, we can see the 
connection to fundamental law’s vital accessibility. Fundamental law 
also includes principles that operate outside the text, perhaps even 
some that constrain its otherwise plain meaning. Akhil Amar gives the 
example of the Vice President presiding over the Senate in her own 
impeachment trial.55 Surely we must rule out this absurd conclusion, 
but we may only do so by drawing on the implicit principle that no one 
should be the judge in her own case. Indeed, this is the very principle 
of fundamental law that Lord Coke invokes in Dr. Bonham’s Case.56 
But it is not simply the historical pedigree of this principle that denotes 
it as fundamental law. Rather, it is the power of the principle to 
account for our intuitions in a wide range of cases—a fact that is 
readily apparent upon considered reflection. From this example, we 
can see that the basic principles of fundamental law are so vital 
precisely because they are accessible to citizens’ common reason. 
This same logic illuminates the McCulloch Principle, one of the 
more famous sentences in the American constitutional canon. In 
McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall upheld the National 
Bank under a broad reading of Congressional power.57 He argued that 
                                                 
54 RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 71 (1985). 
55 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 11-14 (2012). 
Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 (“The Vice President of the United States shall 
be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally 
divided.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power 
to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or 
Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice 
shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two 
thirds of the Members present.”). 
56 J.W. Gough discusses the case and its application to fundamental law in 
FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY. GOUGH, supra 
note 19, at 31-38. 
57 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
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the power to incorporate a bank is implicit in the other provisions of 
Article I, such as the power to tax, to spend, to borrow, to regulate 
commerce, and to defend the nation. 58  These sweeping grants of 
authority also give Congress power over the necessary means to carry 
them out, even without express enumeration.59 Marshall argues that 
this broad reading of implied powers is required by the very nature of 
our Constitution. If, in order “to contain an accurate detail of all the 
subdivisions of which its great powers will admit,” the Constitution 
needed to fully specify “all the means by which they may be carried 
into execution,” the locus of our popular sovereignty could no longer 
serve its core purposes.60 Instead the Constitution “would partake of 
the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the 
human mind. It would, probably, never be understood by the public.”61 
Marshall concludes by once again emphasizing that “we must never 
forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding.”62 A constitution, in 
other words, must constitute us as a people—creating an enduring 
enterprise of self-government that spans generations. The participants 
in this enterprise must be able to apprehend its meaning, even as they 
(and Congress, and the courts) continue to argue over how its general 
provisions apply in new circumstances. This same sentiment appears a 
century later in President Franklin Roosevelt’s pronouncement that the 
Constitution is “a layman’s document, not a lawyer’s contract.”63 
The McCulloch Principle also cuts in another temporal direction. It 
counsels us to conceive of the Constitution as a transgenerational 
project—a project that must not only endure, projecting forward in 
time, but also one that serves as a bridge to the past. When citizens 
apply these fundamental provisions and principles of the Constitution 
to particular circumstances, mediated by particular roles, they must 
invariably make judgments of political morality. What do the 
Constitution’s abstract principles and purposes mean—how do they 
apply—in this particular instance? And this is not simply a matter of 
citizens acquitting their personal responsibilities. Forming these 
                                                 
58 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
59 See id. 
60 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Address on Constitution Day (Sept. 17, 
1937). 
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considered judgments of political morality also connects citizens to the 
moral arc of constitutional history, to its commitments and aspirations, 
its achievements and failures. 
III.   THE CONTENT OF “BLACK LIVES MATTER” AS A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE 
Fundamental law is made up of the most vital provisions and 
principles of the Constitution, whose general terms and concepts are 
accessible to democratic citizens’ common reason. Indeed, it is this 
very property that elevates their importance, inviting citizens to engage 
in public deliberation about political morality, grounding those very 
disagreements. Fundamental law is constitutional law for citizens in 
the first instance, rather than judges or officials. It is what makes the 
Constitution theirs. 
But this is all very abstract. In this Section, I will develop a 
concrete example to clarify my account of fundamental law and why it 
matters. In particular, I will look to the kinds of claims that citizens 
make in politics, as members of social movements, as respondents to 
them, or otherwise. When these claims are pitched at a high level of 
principle, it behooves us to attempt to understand them as claims on 
the Constitution as well. Even if these claims never appear themselves 
in an appellate brief or an oral argument,64 they may well contribute to 
the legal content of the Constitution—to the best interpretation of what 
the Constitution means. 
Here I consider the urgent claim that “Black Lives Matter” is a 
claim on the Constitution, one that serves as a mediating constitutional 
principle. If we can understand this claim as both drawing on and 
shaping our fundamental law, at least in part, we may come to 
appreciate it in an important and distinctive light. “Black Lives 
Matter” is a paradigmatic instance of a contemporary claim of 
fundamental law: law for citizens to interpret, the content of which is 
accessible to their common reason, which both informs and grounds 
their ongoing arguments about basic constitutional values, which 
permits them to claim the Constitution as a contestatory resource to 
counter injustice. 
                                                 
64 Though they might well appear alongside instances of civil disobedience. 
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A. “Black Lives Matter” as a Mediating Principle 
When I say that the claim that Black Lives Matter is a claim on the 
Constitution, I mean that it operates as what Owen Fiss has called a 
“mediating principle.”65 These principles are “mediating because they 
‘stand between’ the courts and the Constitution—to give meaning and 
content to an ideal embodied in the text.”66 Indeed, these principles are 
so pivotal that they “give the provision its only meaning as a guide for 
decision.”67 As Fiss notes, these principles are “only a judicial gloss, 
open to revaluation and redefinition in a way that the text of the 
Constitution is not.” 68  Other interpretive decision makers must 
invariably draw on mediating principles as well, in precisely the same 
way. 
Mediating principles bring particularity to the abstract provisions 
of the Constitution in order to breathe life into them. Fundamental law 
provisions, because they are general and abstract, invite this sort of 
particularizing function whenever they bubble up in constitutional 
                                                 
65 Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 
107, 108 (1976). 
66 Id. at 107. 
67 Id. at 108 (emphasis added). 
68 Id. As Fiss explains in a later article, he initially developed the concept of 
mediating principles in order to explain a disagreement about how to interpret 
and apply the Equal Protection Clause. See Owen M. Fiss, Why The State?, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 781, 784 (1987). Fiss also provides another example from First 
Amendment jurisprudence, the notion that free speech promotes the value of 
self-governance and requires robust public debate. Fiss anchors this “public 
debate principle” in Justice Brennan’s canonical statement from the landmark 
case of New York Times v. Sullivan, emphasizing “a profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open.” N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). A 
final example can be found in Cary Franklin’s work on the “anti-stereotyping 
principle” in sex discrimination law. Franklin argues that, while a concern for 
gender stereotypes is an imperfect gloss of the core purposes of the Equal 
Protection Clause (like Fiss, she subscribes to an anti-subordination account), it 
served as an effective mediating principle during the early stages of doctrinal 
development. Indeed, Franklin suggests that in designing the ACLU’s litigation 
strategy, Ruth Bader Ginsberg strategically fostered the application of 
stereotyping as a gloss on the real gravamen of the wrong. The reason is that 
predominately male judges would be more likely to detect the presence of 
stereotypes than some other alternative measure, especially if the stereotypes in 
question disadvantaged men. See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle 
in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 121-22 (2010). 
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argument. As a result, these mediating principles become part of the 
fundamental law as well—at least provisionally, subject to this process 
of “revaluation and redefinition.” 
One category of mediating principles familiar from the 
constitutional theory literature is the relation between a concept and 
competing conceptions of that concept. Ronald Dworkin first applied 
the distinction between a concept and a conception to the abstract 
clauses of the Constitution in a 1972 essay.69 If I ask you to treat 
someone “fairly,” Dworkin suggests, that abstract concept alone 
cannot supply you with very much guidance for what you ought to do. 
You can only arrive at that particularized decision by drawing on some 
conception of fairness—that it requires equality (but of what?), etc.—a 
conception that is either categorically superior to other interpretations 
or is at least the most fitting under the circumstances. We may 
disagree a great deal about what fairness requires in particular cases.70 
But when we do, we also know that we are disagreeing about the same 
thing. This disagreement is, moreover, what Dworkin would later call 
a “theoretical disagreement,” one that is more substantive and well-
grounded than a mere semantic disagreement that rests on some 
misapprehension of common terms—like a dispute over “where the 
nearest bank is” when one party means a financial institution while the 
other means a river bank.71  
Another category of mediating principles we might call “normative 
elaboration,” or a fuller specification of the values at stake in an 
abstract clause. Fiss’s example considers how to interpret the concept 
of racial equality. 
There appears to be agreement on the purpose of the 
fourteenth amendment; it was intended to secure 
equality for the newly freed slaves and to give 
                                                 
69 DWORKIN, supra note 53, at 131, 134-135. Dworkin would continue to refine his 
interpretivism, which is most fully explicated in RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S 
EMPIRE (1986). 
70 Compare John Hart Ely’s quip in DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 46, at 
58: “We like Rawls, you like Nozick. We win, 6-3. Statute invalidated.” This is, 
of course, not a disagreement that turns on any kind of reasoned justification or 
interpretive argument. 
71 Cf. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 69, at 1-44. This sort of mix-up is not 
at all like what participants in genuine moral and interpretive debates take 
themselves to be doing—much the same, I hope to show, as with the 
phenomenon of disagreements about principles of fundamental law. 
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constitutional status to the ideal of racial equality. 
There has been disagreement, however, over the 
particular principles or rules that should be applied to 
realize this ideal.72 
In particular, Fiss suggests that an individualized or 
“antidiscrimination” reading of the Equal Protection Clause does not 
fully determine the content of its commitment to racial equality. 
Rather, it serves as a mediating principle (one that, for example, 
praises colorblindness and condemns affirmative action). Fiss defends 
an alternative mediating principle, one that tracks the distinctive wrong 
of subordinating disadvantaged groups (and which also requires color 
consciousness and group-advantaging remedies like affirmative 
action).73 Many similar principles are necessary to bore down on the 
values of the freedom of speech (Is it rooted in autonomy? 
Democracy?)74 and religion (Is it based on accommodation? Equality? 
Strict separation?)75. 
Yet another kind of mediating principle might play a role in 
applying an abstract clause involving questions of social meaning. I 
have in mind two memorable lines from the Court’s segregation cases. 
First, from Plessy v. Ferguson, comes this infamous utterance: 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s 
argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced 
separation of the two races stamps the colored race 
with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by 
reason of anything found in the act, but solely because 
                                                 
72 Fiss, supra note 68, at 784. 
73 Id. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging 
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L. J. 1278 (2011) 
(providing a slightly different characterization of these competing principles and 
introducing a third that traces the Powell-O’Connor-Kennedy line). See also K. 
ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL 
MORALITY OF RACE (1996) (offering an analysis and comparison of colorblind 
and color-conscious theories of the Constitution). 
74 Compare Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFFS. 204 (1972), with ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS 
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). 
75 For discussion of these questions, see, e.g., COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE 
STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT SAY? (2012). 
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the colored race chooses to put that construction upon 
it.76 
But two generations later, drawing in part on psychological evidence 
but also on a considered judgment of political morality and social 
meaning, the Court in Brown v. Board of Education held 
unequivocally that “in the field of public education the doctrine of 
‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal.”77 Both of these assessments are judgments of how 
to understand the social meaning of an institutional arrangement, and 
both draw on the mediating principles to do that work. While Plessy 
clings to expressive neutrality—to an almost farcical caricature of 
willful blindness—Brown hinges on realism, staring down Jim Crow’s 
conveyed message of inferiority. 
The model of competing (sometimes quite disparate) mediating 
principles explains the familiar phenomenon of deep constitutional 
disagreement. A mediating constitutional principle, in one sense, is the 
relevant constitutional meaning—it is necessary to give the abstract 
clause any particularized meaning at all. But in another sense, 
mediating constitutional principles come from without: by design, they 
mediate citizen-interpreters’ considered judgments of political 
morality, drawing them like a straw from a milk carton. But, as I hope 
to show, this is not a bug but a feature. As citizens imbue the 
Constitution with their conceptions of justice, the fundamental law 
thereby draws nearer to the ideal of law that is self-given. 
These examples all illustrate how courts employ—indeed, must 
employ—mediating principles to decide cases. But the point extends 
beyond the courts—intermediate principles are essential for any 
decision-guiding interpretation. For this reason, mediating principles 
are an integral part of citizens’ interpretive toolkit. Moreover, 
disagreement over competing mediating principles grounds our 
constitutional debates—so that even when we disagree about so much, 
we continue to reason, together, about the same scheme of principle. 
And when it comes to principles of fundamental law, courts must not 
only help to frame that conversation on behalf of citizens—they must 
also pay close attention to what citizens have to say. 
                                                 
76 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
77 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 495 
(1954). 
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“Black Lives Matter” is just such a mediating principle—one that 
operates as a gloss not only of the Equal Protection Clause, but also a 
host of other provisions: the Fifteenth Amendment’s guarantee against 
racial discrimination in voting, the protections of a jury of one’s peers 
in civil rights litigation, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
“unreasonable searches and seizures,” and the Eighth Amendment’s 
bar on “cruel and unusual punishment” and “excessive fines,” just to 
name a few.78 Underlying all of these provisions—at least, a reading of 
these provisions that I believe to be the correct one—is an awareness 
of racial injustice in our current society and the Reconstructed 
Constitution’s commitment to eradicating it. 
                                                 
78 See, e.g., Justice Sotomayor’s arresting dissent in Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 
2056, 2064-71 (2016), cataloguing both the sweeping extent of police power to 
search the bodies of people of color and the way in which this subjugation 
alienates them as constitutional citizens. It is telling that Justice Sotomayor cites 
not only to the body of case law, but also to scholarship on the problems of mass 
incarceration and seminal works of Black political thought. Her closing 
paragraph directly alludes to Eric Garner’s death by chokehold and the rousing 
cry of Black Lives Matter activists that “they can’t breathe.” “This Court has 
given officers an array of instruments to probe and examine you. When we 
condone officers’ use of these devices without adequate cause, we give them 
reason to target pedestrians in an arbitrary manner. We also risk treating 
members of our communities as second-class citizens . . . [I]t is no secret that 
people of color are disproportionate victims of this type of scrutiny. See 
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 95-136 (2010). For generations, 
black and brown parents have given their children “the talk”—instructing them 
never to run down the street; always keep your hands where they can be seen; do 
not even think of talking back to a stranger—all out of fear of how an officer 
with a gun will react to them. See, e.g., W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK 
FOLK (1903); J. BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME (1963); T. COATES, BETWEEN 
THE WORLD AND ME (2015). By legitimizing the conduct that produces this 
double consciousness, this case tells everyone, white and black, guilty and 
innocent, that an officer can verify your legal status at any time. It says that your 
body is subject to invasion while courts excuse the violation of your rights. It 
implies that you are not a citizen of a democracy but the subject of a carceral 
state, just waiting to be cataloged. We must not pretend that the countless people 
who are routinely targeted by police are “isolated.” They are the canaries in the 
coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can breathe in this 
atmosphere. See L. GUINIER & G. TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY 274–283 
(2002). They are the ones who recognize that unlawful police stops corrode all 
our civil liberties and threaten all our lives. Until their voices matter too, our 
justice system will continue to be anything but.” Id. 
2019 "Black Lives Matter" 27 
 
B. “Black Lives Matter” Recognizes Difference and Rejects a 
Colorblind Constitution 
We should understand “Black Lives Matter” as demanding some 
official recognition of difference in the lived experience of Black 
citizens, especially within the institutions of the legal system.79 The 
movement’s genesis was predicated on the profound disparities in how 
the criminal justice system operates: in who dies at the hands of the 
police, in who faces prosecution and how, in who fills the jails and 
which communities bear the staggering cost of mass incarceration.80 
Alicia Garza, one of the cofounders of the movement, makes the point 
in stark terms: 
When we say Black Lives Matter, we are talking about 
the ways in which Black people are deprived of our 
basic human rights and dignity. It is an 
acknowledgement Black poverty and genocide is state 
violence. It is an acknowledgment that 1 million Black 
people are locked in cages in this country—one half of 
all people in prisons or jails—is an act of state 
violence. . . . And the fact is that the lives of Black 
people—not ALL people—exist within these conditions 
is consequence of state violence.81 
Garza specifically targets the rejoinder that “all lives matter,” because 
it “perpetuate[s] a level of White supremacist domination by 
reproducing a tired trope that we are all the same, rather than 
acknowledging” this legacy of systematic violence and 
subordination. 82  Nevertheless, the colorblind refrain that “all lives 
matter” is a common one—for example, it was the initial (albeit later 
retracted) reaction from all the various candidates for the Democratic 
                                                 
79 Alicia Garza, A Herstory of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement by Alicia Garza, 
FEMINIST WIRE (Oct. 7, 2014), 
http://www.thefeministwire.com/2014/10/blacklivesmatter-2/ 
[http://perma.cc/AA23-GVYF]. 
80 Id.; see also A Vision for Black Lives: Policy Demands for Black Power, 
Freedom, & Justice, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES (2016), 
https://policy.m4bl.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/20160726-m4bl-Vision-
Booklet-V3.pdf [https://perma.cc/KYX6-FZ4S]. 
81 See Garza, supra note 79. 
82 Id. 
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nomination when they were confronted by members of the 
movement.83 
Whatever anxieties provoked this flat-footed response, it reminds 
me of Herbert Wechsler’s infamous fretting over whether Brown v. 
Board of Education was constitutionally sound. In his 1959 Holmes 
Lecture at Harvard Law School (what would become one of the most-
cited pieces of legal scholarship of all time—although not, of course, 
for this reason),84 Wechsler worried that the decision to desegregate 
public schools could not be supported by any sort of “neutral principle 
of constitutional law”85—i.e., a reason that would apply in the same 
manner to all similarly situated parties, regardless of their identity. For 
Wechsler, because Brown and its progeny prohibited segregation even 
in facilities that were nominally equal, its reasoning ultimately reduced 
to a claim about the freedom of association: the wrong of segregation 
was preventing children from attending the school that they desired.86 
But the problem that haunted Wechsler was that integration, the 
necessary remedy, also appeared to violate the freedom of association, 
symmetrically.87 
There are many problems with this line of argument.88 But my 
point here is that the colorblind concern behind “all lives matter” 
shares a common and mistaken assumption with Wechsler’s worry. To 
say anything besides “all lives matter,” the argument goes, is to 
                                                 
83 Tamara Keith, Democratic Candidates Stumble Over Black Lives Matter 
Movement, (July 31, 2015), 
www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/07/31/427851451/democratic-
candidates-stumble-over-black-lives-matter-movement [https://perma.cc/3V4S-
5UXL]. Indeed, the movement has “rejected” the endorsement of the 
Democratic Party, suggesting that it has been inattentive to these key issues for 
too long. 
84 See Pamela S. Karlan, What Can Brown Do for You?: Neutral Principles and 
the Struggle Over The Equal Protection Clause, 58 DUKE L.J. 1049, 1049 
(2009). 
85 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 1 (1959). 
86 Id. at 31. 
87 Id. at 34. 
88 For a contemporaneous refutation, see Charles L. Black, The Lawfulness of the 
Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). 
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commit a similar violation of neutrality—it disparages the lives of 
others.89 
But the Constitution is, unmistakably, not neutral with respect to 
race. Far from it—and the claim that “Black Lives Matter” can serve 
to remind us of that fact. There is a longstanding debate stretching 
back to the antebellum era about whether the founding-era text favored 
slavery. William Lloyd Garrison (and, for a time, Frederick Douglass) 
argued that the Constitution was “a covenant with death, and an 
agreement with hell” for the ways in which it entrenched the 
institutions of slavery and white supremacy.90 Slaves were property 
who, when they fled, had to be rendered to their owners.91 Though 
they could not vote, of course, slaves’ presence boosted the political 
power of the South, since they counted as “three fifths of all other [i.e., 
not “free”] Persons” for the purposes of representation.92 The initial 
document also delayed Congress’s ability to ban the slave trade until 
1808.93 However we interpret these pieces of evidence, the answer 
                                                 
89 The most charitable way to understand the defense of “all lives matter” as a 
rejoinder to the claim that “Black Lives Matter” will likely sound in the register 
of colorblind constitutionalism. The contention is that every instance of 
differential treatment or distinction based on race violates the constitutional 
commitment to equality and fails to treat individuals with respect and dignity. 
See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 309-10 (2013) 
(“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very 
nature odious to a free people, and therefore are contrary to our traditions and 
hence constitutionally suspect. Because racial characteristics so seldom provide 
a relevant basis for disparate treatment, the Equal Protection Clause demands 
that racial classifications be subjected to the most rigid scrutiny.”) (cleaned up) 
(majority opinion of Kennedy, J.); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle 
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (“The way to stop discrimination on 
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”) (majority 
opinion of Roberts, C.J.) The claim that “all lives,” not just “black lives” might 
be thought to proceed from these colorblind commitments. 
90 24 LIBERATOR n. 27, July 7, 1854, at 106 (reporting the remarks of William 
Lloyd Garrison in Framingham, Massachusetts, on July 4, 1854). For a 
contemporary refutation, Sean Wilentz, Constitutionally, Slavery Is No National 
Institution, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2015), 
www.nytimes.com/2015/09/16/opinion/constitutionally-slavery-is-no-national-
institution.html?_r=2 [http://perma.cc/Q2ZP-5FNE]. 
91 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by the Thirteenth Amendment. 
92 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
93 As we will see, Douglass would later argue that the Constitution was against 
racial chattel slavery, even at the founding. Ronald Dworkin gestures at a similar 
argument in his review of Robert Cover’s Justice Accused. See Ronald 
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cannot be that the Constitution was blind to the national problem of 
race. 
And there is no question that the Constitution became explicitly 
conscious of race at the end of the Civil War and the onset of the First 
Reconstruction. The Thirteenth Amendment directly abolished the 
practice of slavery, 94  while the Fourteenth Amendment sought to 
extend citizenship to freed Blacks and protect their basic rights, 
directly overturning the key holdings of the Dred Scott case.95 Indeed, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which passed between these two 
amendments, guaranteed to “all persons” the same level of rights 
protections “as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 96  The Fifteenth 
Amendment then sought to ensure that citizens’ voting rights “not be 
denied . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.”97 
These provisions are not colorblind. They recognize difference, not 
sameness. In vital ways, they each insist that Black Lives Matter. 
Together, they acknowledge the institutionalized existence of White 
Supremacy, both in public and private forms. The Reconstructed 
Constitution—our Constitution in 2018, not the initial document of 
1789—is dedicated to eradicating structural racism in the form of 
chattel slavery and its enduring impacts.98  For over a century this 
commitment would continue unheeded, and even after the Second 
Reconstruction of the 1960s, the work remains incomplete.99 But the 
Black Lives Matter movement is correct to recognize the difference in 
how structural forces have shaped the prospects and identities of black 
                                                                                                                   
Dworkin, “Review of Robert Cover, Justice Accused,” Times Literary 
Supplement, December 5, 1975. 
94 James A. Wynn, America’s First ‘Black Lives Matter’ Event, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER (Dec. 5, 2015), www.charlotteobserver.com/opinion/op-
ed/article48053305.html [https://perma.cc/VY7J-KB7G]. 
95 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 380-85 
(2005). For another argument linking the Fourteenth Amendment to 
#Blacklivesmatter, see Cass R. Sunstein, Black Lives Matter Reclaims the 14th 
Amendment, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 1, 2015), 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-09-01/black-lives-matter-
reclaims-the-14th-amendment. 
96 Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991). 
97 U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
98 See AMAR, supra note 95, at 351-401. 
99 See ALEXANDER, supra note 8. 
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citizens, and that this disparity is unjust. And on this question our 
Constitution, in plain terms, is in utter agreement. 
Of course, not everyone agrees with this interpretation—
conservatives have consistently expounded a colorblind reading of the 
Constitution.100 But my point here is simple and twofold. First, there is 
a firm constitutional basis (even an originalist one!)101 for a color-
conscious reading of the Constitution. Second, and more importantly, 
we can see how the Constitution as fundamental law serves to ground 
interpretive disagreements—even those that run along deep fissures on 
questions of political morality. Participants who take up these 
questions, at least at some level, are engaged in interpreting principles 
of our fundamental law. 
C. “Black Lives Matter” Acknowledges a Continuing Legacy 
of White Supremacy, Which Alienates Black Citizens from 
Their Institutions 
The claim that “Black Lives Matter”—in the very implication that 
the words need to be said—serves as an indictment of our country’s 
troubled legacy of White Supremacy,102 one that continues to this day. 
As Michelle Alexander has observed, it weaves and stretches through 
different institutional forms, from chattel slavery to Jim Crow to our 
current era of mass incarceration. 103  Members of the Black Lives 
Matter movement put the point in the following way, in their 2014 
“State of the Black Union”: 
This country must abandon the lie that the deep 
psychological wounds of slavery, racism and structural 
oppression are figments of the Black imagination. . . . 
Our schools are designed to funnel our children into 
prisons. Our police departments have declared war 
against our community. . . . This corrupt democracy 
was built on Indigenous genocide and chattel slavery. 
And continues to thrive on the brutal exploitation of 
                                                 
100 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 748 (2007) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race.”). For further discussion, see Karlan, supra 
note 82. 
101 See AMAR, supra note 95, at 351-401; BALKIN, supra note 43, at 220-55. 
102 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
103 ALEXANDER, supra note 8. 
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people of color. We recognize that not even a Black 
President will pronounce our truths. We must continue 
the task of making America uncomfortable about 
institutional racism.104  
In the fall of 2016, the Movement for Black Lives released a platform, 
the product of an inclusive, year-long deliberative process. 105  This 
document articulates a set of policy demands varying in concreteness 
(such as “an end to the war against Black people,” investment of 
resources in communities of color alongside divestment from coercive 
and carceral institutions, reparations, economic justice, and black 
political power), anchoring the aspirations for “black power, freedom, 
and justice.”106 
Black humanity and dignity requires Black political will 
and power. Despite constant exploitation and perpetual 
oppression, Black people have bravely and brilliantly 
been the driving force pushing the U.S. towards the 
ideals it articulates but has never achieved. . . . 
We have created this platform to articulate and support 
the ambitions and work of Black people. We also seek 
to intervene in the current political climate and assert a 
clear vision, particularly for those who claim to be our 
allies, of the world we want them to help us create. 
We reject false solutions and believe we can achieve a 
complete transformation of the current systems, which 
place profit over people and make it impossible for 
many of us to breathe. Together, we demand an end to 
the wars against Black people. We demand that the 
government repair the harms that have been done to 
Black communities in the form of reparations and 
targeted long-term investments. We also demand a 
defunding of the systems and institutions that 
                                                 
104 State of the Black Union: The Shadow of Crisis Has Not Passed, TRUTHOUT 
(Jan. 22, 2015), https://truthout.org/articles/state-of-the-black-union-the-
shadow-of-crisis-has-not-passed/ [http://perma.cc/AYL8-4RT7]. 
105 Akbar, supra note 12, at 421. 
106 A Vision for Black Lives: Policy Demands for Black Power, Freedom, & Justice, 
supra note 80. 
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criminalize and cage us. This document articulates our 
vision of a fundamentally different world.107 
This stirring call for justice speaks to a deep alienation from the 
institutions of White Supremacy, representing a profound failure by 
the lights of our core constitutional values.108 
As the critical race theorist Charles Lawrence notes, Black citizens 
have a distinctive and deeply ingrained perspective on the institutions 
that govern them: “[W]e also know the experience of the outsider.”109 
In a piece in Politico, Nikole Hannah-Jones tells the story of attending 
an event on July Fourth on Long Island with her family, friends, and a 
young student staying with her for the summer. When a gunman began 
to fire shots in the air, panic erupted, and the party scrambled together 
for safety. Hannah-Jones turned and noticed that the student, breathing 
heavily, was recounting the events on the phone. She writes: 
Unable to imagine whom she would be calling at that 
moment, I asked her, somewhat indignantly, if she 
couldn’t have waited until we got to safety before 
calling her mom. “No,” she said. “I am talking to the 
police.” My friends and I locked eyes in stunned 
silence. Between the four adults, we hold six degrees. 
Three of us are journalists. And not one of us had 
thought to call the police. We had not even considered 
it. We also are all black.110 
She continues, describing a profound sense of alienation. 
                                                 
107 Id. 
108 There is also a sense in which this “failure” is simply “the system working as it 
is supposed to,” as Paul Butler puts it. See Paul Butler, The System Is Working 
the Way It Is Supposed To: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. 
L.J. 1419, 1425 (2016). And fair enough. But it should also be clear that the 
success of these forces of white supremacy within the institutional structure 
represent a systematic derogation of the constitutional commitment to equal 
citizenship. As we will see in the next Section, they violate the Constitution as it 
is best understood. 
109 Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech 
on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 435 (1990). 
110 Nikole Hannah-Jones, A Letter From Black America, POLITICO (Mar.-Apr. 
2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/03/letter-from-black-
america-police-115545.html#ixzz3dAaPFlZe [https://perma.cc/K7RM-6N6E]. 
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For those of you reading this who may not be black, or 
perhaps Latino, this is my chance to tell you that a 
substantial portion of your fellow citizens in the United 
States of America have little expectation of being 
treated fairly by the law or receiving justice. It’s 
possible this will come as a surprise to you. But to a 
very real extent, you have grown up in a different 
country than I have.111 
Quoting Khalil Gibran Muhammad, she notes that “White people, by 
and large, do not know what it is like to be occupied by a police 
force. . . . Because they are treated like individuals, they believe that if 
I am not breaking the law, I will never be abused.”112 But because that 
assumption does not hold according to the lived experience of people 
of color, “many of us cannot fundamentally trust the people who are 
charged with keeping us and our communities safe.”113 
I have never had to endure such alienation, and even as I read over 
this account once more, I find it staggering. But, if we push a little 
further, we can see how the claim that Black Lives Matter, even as it 
speaks to this profound alienation, also carves out its limits—by 
operating as a claim of justice and invoking a constitutional principle. 
The movement asserts its claims not only as a matter of human rights, 
but also in virtue of citizenship and membership in the political 
community. The State of the Black Union suggests that “[t]his 
country,” in part because of its troubled legacy of White Supremacy, 
“owes Black citizens nothing less than full recognition of our human 
rights. . . . None of us are free until all of us are free.”114 The essay 
closes with an invocation of popular sovereignty borrowed from the 
Preamble and a reference to the Declaration of Independence: “We the 
People, committed to the declaration that Black lives matter, will fight 
                                                 
111 Id. 
112 Id. (quoting KHALIL GHIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF 
BLACKNESS (2010)). 
113 Id. 
114 Black Lives Matter Declaration—State of the Black Union, DECLARATION 
PROJECT (2015), http://www.declarationproject.org/?p=1654 
[https://perma.cc/W733-KVFV]. Cf. MALCOLM X, The Ballot or the Bullet, in 
MALCOLM X SPEAKS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS 23, 35 (1965) 
(“Human rights are something you were born with. Human rights are your God-
given rights. Human rights are the rights that are recognized by all nations of 
this earth.”). 
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to end the structural oppression that prevents so many from realizing 
their dreams. We cannot, and will not stop until America recognizes 
the value of Black life.”115 To my eye, at least, this invocation of 
popular sovereignty and the Constitution is not a coincidence. Indeed, 
I believe that claiming that Black Lives Matter serves to remedy the 
alienation of Black citizens, precisely because it is a claim on the 
Constitution. 
D. “Black Lives Matter” as Emancipatory Protestantism 
This brings us to an important distinction. Even if institutions 
acting under color of law continue to subordinate and alienate Black 
citizens—and even if the Supreme Court of the United State blesses the 
constitutionality of those actions—that, by itself, need not alienate 
Black citizens from their Constitution. For sometimes (perhaps often?) 
the Supreme Court gets the Constitution wrong.116 As we saw earlier, 
the Constitution, when fully Reconstructed and properly understood, 
does not countenance White Supremacy. It recognizes that Black Lives 
Matter. Where the institutions and practices of White Supremacy 
persist, one of the Constitution’s central purposes and designs is to 
eradicate and reconstruct them, root and branch. This aspiration aims 
to redeem the promissory note of equality found in the Declaration, 
and it has confronted different institutional barriers across the 
generations, with progress that is often reluctant, halting, and 
unsatisfactory. But there is no mistaking the Constitution’s 
commitment to equal citizenship. Its aspirational presence in the 
Constitution is central—as central as the institutional neglect of Black 
lives is glaring. To say that “Black Lives Matter” is to express or 
recognize Black Americans’ alienation from their institutions, but not 
their Constitution.117 
                                                 
115 Black Lives Matter Declaration—State of the Black Union, supra note 114. 
116 For an illustration of the Court’s own recognition of this fact, see, e.g., Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992) (“Plessy was 
wrong the day it was decided.”) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896)). 
117 I should state clearly that I am not suggesting that we interpret “Black Lives 
Matter” as exclusively a claim on the Constitution. Indeed, in many (perhaps 
most) contexts, it is a claim about justice, identity, and humanity. Nor is my 
general thesis about the Constitution as fundamental law a claim that all of 
citizens’ political activity must be funneled through the pipeline of constitutional 
interpretation. Nevertheless, the claim that “Black Lives Matter” matters for 
constitutional interpretation, especially in the context of certain roles. 
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The key idea here is the concept of protestant interpretation,118 the 
notion that citizens are responsible for independently interpreting their 
fundamental law. This interpretive attitude has deep roots in the 
history of Black constitutional thought, exemplified most clearly in the 
writings of our nation’s greatest citizen-interpreter, Frederick 
Douglass. 119  And in this example we will see two features of 
fundamental law at work. First, we will see Douglass deploying the 
Constitution as a contestatory resource, invoking the inclusive 
language of the Preamble to enlist the Constitution onto the side of 
justice. Second, we will see Douglass constructively engaging with the 
past, interpreting our constitutional history in its best light. This thread 
carries throughout the storied careers of other central figures in Black 
constitutional thought, leading all the way to the Black Lives Matter 
movement today. 
In March of 1860, as the sectional conflict between Northern and 
Southern states was roiling, Frederick Douglass gave a speech in 
Glasgow, Scotland.120 Three years prior, the Supreme Court had held 
in Scott v. Sanford that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional 
and that freed blacks were not citizens under the Constitution. 
Douglass was a self-educated escaped slave, and he spoke not as a 
lawyer or an official, but as a citizen—forcefully arguing that the 
Constitution was opposed to slavery.121 
                                                 
118 See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 29, 44 (1988); see also 
BALKIN, supra note 42. For particular discussion of Douglass’s speech as part of 
the constitutional canon, see J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of 
Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1021 (1998); STEPHEN MACEDO, 
LIBERAL VIRTUES 102 (Oxford U. Press ed., 1990). 
119 See Mariah Zeisberg, Frederick Douglass: Citizen Interpreter 3 (Aug. 2010) 
(unpublished draft), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1583683 [https://perma.cc/J86X-
LAUN]. For further discussion of the evolution of Douglass’s constitutional 
thought, see Wayne D. Moore, Constitutional Citizenship, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
POLITICS 239 (Sotirios A. Barber & Robert P. George eds., 2001). See also 
Dorothy Roberts, The Meaning of Blacks’ Fidelity to the Constitution, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1761, 1766 (1997). 
120 FREDERICK DOUGLASS, SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 380 (Philip S. 
Foner ed., 1999). 
121 Id. Although this is the fullest and most eloquent account of Douglass’s 
constitutional arguments, one can see the full development of his ideas in 
Foner’s collection. Particularly illustrative are Douglass’s exchanges with 
Gerritt Smith, and the final turn that Douglass takes in the end of his famous 
address on the meaning of the Fourth of July to Black citizens. Id. at 137, 204. 
See also Moore, supra note 119, for further discussion. 
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Douglass begins, appropriately, with some thoughts on the nature 
of the Constitution, which track what we have already said about the 
principle of constitutional supremacy and the features of fundamental 
law. 
It is no vague, indefinite, floating, unsubstantial, ideal 
something, coloured according to any man’s fancy, now 
a weasel, now a whale, and now nothing. On the 
contrary, it is a plainly written document, . . . full and 
complete in itself. No Court in America, no Congress, 
no President, can add a single word thereto, or take a 
single word therefrom. It is a great national enactment 
done by the people, and can only be altered, amended, 
or added to by the people.122 
There is a fact of the matter about what the Constitution says and what 
it means—its words are plainly inscribed and its principles accessible 
to our common reason. No institution may “add a single word” to the 
Constitution, even through interpretive efforts, for that role is reserved 
for the citizens, the people themselves. But that is exactly what the 
Taney Court does in Dred Scott; namely, the Justices read the word 
“slavery” into the Constitution, where Douglass insists it does not 
belong.123 
The key to Douglass’s argument is a distinctive interpretive 
presumption: “In all matters where laws are taught to be made the 
means of oppression, cruelty, and wickedness, I am for strict 
construction. I will concede nothing.”124 Thus, proponents of slavery 
must “give the Constitution a pro-slavery interpretation; because upon 
its face it of itself conveys no such meaning, but a very opposite” 
one.125 The provisions that “have been pressed into the service of the 
human fleshmongers of America” make no express mention of slavery, 
and they should be read narrowly.126 For example, Douglass suggests 
                                                 
122 DOUGLASS, supra note 120, at 381. The reference is to Polonius’s formless 
clouds in WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2. 
123 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 409 (1857), superseded by constitutional 
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124 DOUGLASS, supra note 120, at 386. Note also that this objection suffers from an 
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against “activist judges.” 
125 Id. at 382. 
126 Id. at 383. 
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that the Three-fifths Clause operates as a kind of penalty against states 
permitting slavery, depriving those states of representation in the 
House that they would otherwise have.127 Douglass further notes that 
the Importation Clause is the only provision in the Constitution with an 
express sunset, twenty years after ratification and fifty-eight years 
before Douglass’s address.128 And its implicit trajectory suggests an 
overarching purpose and aspiration that, in the long run, slavery would 
ultimately be eclipsed. Douglass’s most ambitious claims attempt to 
blunt the impact of Article IV’s Fugitive Persons Clause. Here, 
Douglass points to the record of the convention, where the delegates 
rejected an earlier draft that explicitly referenced and targeted 
slaves.129 Each of these clauses assiduously avoids any mention of 
slavery as an institution. 
Mariah Zeisberg suggests that it is at this point when Douglass 
goes off the rails, embracing a kind of “hyperliteralism” that “loses 
contact with the idea of legal fidelity at all.” 130  But, intriguingly, 
Zeisberg claims that Douglass’s misreading is deliberate, “strategic,” 
even “subversive”—a distinctive interpretive stance that highlights the 
injustice of the institution and is available to Douglass through his 
status as a citizen, rather than an official.131 This reading strikes me as 
a bit too esoteric for Douglass as a model citizen-interpreter, seeking 
to advance arguments that are accessible to his fellow interpreters’ 
common reason. But the idea of fundamental law can help us to 
understand Douglass on his own terms and to take his claims seriously. 
One reason to mistrust Douglass’s claims might be the worry that 
he is employing a kind of natural law methodology: something to the 
effect of, “the Constitution is against slavery because it is unjust.” But 
though Douglass’s interpretive presumption against injustice 
undoubtedly rests on some considerations of political morality, his 
argument cuts much more narrowly than that. Douglass is clear when 
he insists that the basic provisions of the Constitution are not 
indeterminate—unlike Hamlet and Polonius’s amorphous clouds, 
                                                 
127 Id. at 384. 
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130 Zeisberg, supra note 117, at 25. 
131 Id. at 26. Zeisberg also notes the text’s express mention of states’ positive law. 
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“now a weasel, now a whale, and now nothing.”132 Nor is the content 
of justice —even in the face of deep disagreement about its 
requirements—even remotely like “any man’s fancy.” Douglass does 
not treat the text as malleable, even if its meaning depends in part on 
what justice requires. For Douglass, constitutional meaning is 
objective, and it must be plain and comprehensible to citizens’ 
common reason.133 Additionally, there is a clear limit to the range of 
discretion that the presumption against injustice permits. Even this 
strong presumption must give way when the injustice is “expressed 
with irresistible clearness.”134 What we see in these arguments, then, is 
not the petty grift of some constitutional huckster, but the earnest work 
of a citizen interpreter valiantly continuing to resist constitutional evil. 
And the idea of emancipatory protestantism tells us why he seeks to 
imbue the Constitution with his conception of justice—because, as a 
citizen, it is his Constitution. 
With regard to the intentions and expectations of the framers, 
many of whom owned slaves, Douglass stresses that only the text that 
was ratified can determine constitutional meaning. Striking a tone that 
resonates with the McCulloch Principle, Douglass notes that those 
intentions “were for a generation, but the Constitution is for ages.”135 
And as to the founding generation, 
Whatever we may owe to them, we certainly owe it to 
ourselves . . . to maintain the truth of our own 
language, and to allow no villainy . . . to shelter itself 
under a fair-seeming and virtuous language. We owe it 
to ourselves to compel the devil to wear his own 
garments, and to make wicked laws speak out their 
wicked intentions.136 
Once again, we see that this interpretive presumption is underwritten 
by a deep and abiding constitutional faith. Compare Dr. King’s similar 
sentiment from almost a century later, closing his letter from a 
Birmingham Jail: 
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One day the South will know that when these 
disinherited children of God sat down at lunch counters 
they were in reality standing up for the best in the 
American dream . . . thusly, carrying our whole nation 
back to those great wells of democracy which were dug 
deep by the founding fathers in the formulation of the 
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence.137 
Those “great wells of democracy” are none other than our fundamental 
law. By invoking them, both King and Douglass are highlighting their 
inclusion and standing as citizens, full members of the political 
community. They both appeal to their fellow citizens, in the present 
and across the generations, to read our Constitution at its best and 
avoid constitutional injustice. And even though each figure encounters 
substantial opposition to his aspirational reading of the Constitution, 
he has faith—both in the Constitution itself and in the interpretive 
community that spans the generations. Like the moral arc of the 
universe, we might say that the Constitution and its meaning bend 
toward justice over time. To say as much is not to break faith in the 
constitutional project; it is to renew it. 
Constitutional protestantism and constitutional faith subsist on a 
commitment to imbuing and enriching the document with one’s own 
conception of justice. And Douglass observes a crucial asymmetry 
here: we do not warp the Constitution by imbuing it with justice; we 
only distort it when we countenance—when we fail to properly 
resist—an unjust reading.138 And this is not just a matter of faith, but a 
consequence of the Constitution’s holism: that it is “full and complete 
in itself.” Douglass canvasses the purposes of the Preamble, for “the 
details of a law are to be interpreted in the light of the declared objects 
sought by the law.”139 This is especially true of our fundamental law. 
The objects here set forth are six in number: union, 
defence, welfare, tranquility, justice, and liberty. These 
are all good objects, and slavery, so far from being 
among them, is a foe of them all. But it has been said 
that Negroes are not included within the benefits sought 
                                                 
137 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in CIVIL 
DISOBEDIENCE IN FOCUS 68, 84 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1991). 
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under this declaration. This is said by the slaveholders 
in America . . . but it is not said by the Constitution 
itself. Its language is “we the people;” not we the white 
people, not even we the citizens, not we the privileged 
class, not we the high, not we the low, but we the 
people; not we the horses, sheep, and swine, and wheel-
barrows, but we the people, we the human inhabitants; 
and, if Negroes are people, they are included in the 
benefits for which the Constitution of America was 
ordained and established.140 
Douglass is right to note that the grand purposes of the Preamble do 
not sit well alongside the institution of slavery, that their scope carries 
a presumption of inclusion. And in light of these commitments and 
aspirations, we may derive our own protestant interpretation. Indeed, 
“it does not follow that the Constitution is in favour of these wrongs 
because the slaveholders have given it that interpretation.”141 We need 
not accept slavery as integral to the Constitution, for it was the slavers’ 
errant reading that put it there. 
We should understand the claim that “Black Lives Matter” as a 
mediating constitutional principle for the same reasons that Douglass 
pressed his interpretive presumption against constitutional injustice. 
By offering a protestant interpretation, those who utter the claim that 
“Black Lives Matter” imbue the Constitution with justice, grounding 
their claims and establishing their standing as equal citizens under the 
law. In this way, even as Black citizens are alienated from the 
subordinating institutions of White Supremacy, they keep faith with 
their Constitution—which is dedicated to Reconstructing that political 
order. 
The reader may be skeptical of many of the interpretive claims I 
have made. But I would simply note that to wager this sort of doubt is 
also to participate in a kind of interpretation—of America’s 
constitutional history, of the arc of its aspirations, of whether and how 
we have fallen short of them as a people, of which groups and 
individuals have counted as constitutive members of that polity and 
what the terms of that membership signify. These are claims about 
America’s fundamental law, and they are of the kind that citizens can 
and should engage in. 
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IV.  THE STAKES: WHY TAKE “BLACK LIVES MATTER” AS A CLAIM 
OF FUNDAMENTAL LAW 
“Black Lives Matter” as a constitutional principle fits the 
parameters and features of fundamental law that I laid out in Section I, 
because it is quintessentially a claim for citizens. The sorts of textual 
and principled arguments that I hashed out in Section II do not dwell 
in the nooks and crannies of technical doctrine, but are instead 
characteristically accessible to citizens’ common reason—broader 
claims, for example, about the continuing institutional legacy of White 
Supremacy. And we saw that the Constitution will bear the weight of 
substantial disagreement, grounding the debate over colorblindness as 
an aspiration. Most importantly, we saw from Frederick Douglass’s 
emancipatory protestantism that the Constitution can be a contestatory 
resource from which citizens may issue a distinctive kind of claim: a 
resonant harmony that blends constitutional interpretation, aspirational 
justice, and radical self-inclusion. 142  The claim the “Black Lives 
Matter” sounds in that same register. 
Once we make that interpretive leap, the normative, theoretical, 
and legal stakes come into view. In this Section, we will see how 
citizens’ participating in interpreting principles of fundamental law 
give rise to what I call the “constitutional bases of respect.” We will 
see how the idea of fundamental law effectively tethers interpretive 
positions of wide-ranging disagreement. We will consider the claim 
that “Black Lives Matter,” as well as its constitutional antipode—a 
cluster of views rooted in white ethno-nationalism. Finally, we will 
observe the legal stakes of accepting “Black Lives Matter” as a 
mediating principle of constitutional law—how this principle of 
fundamental law translates into the settled strictures of ordinary law 
and legal doctrine. 
A. Emancipatory Protestantism and Constitutional Self-
Inclusion 
Notice the distinctive political acoustics of a claim like “Black 
Lives Matter.” Unlike other interpretive claims that we could imagine, 
this sort of claim in particular is most efficacious—perhaps only ever 
fully efficacious—when uttered by citizens, both to officials in their 
capacities and to civil society at large, as a resounding claim of 
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constitutional justice. Through these words, disaffected citizens tell the 
broader political community that their Constitution and our 
Constitution are one and the same—that it is dedicated to uprooting 
and Reconstructing the institutions of White Supremacy. 
There is a deeper point here, a distinctive value of citizens’ 
normative and critical engagement with the legal past. I aim to show 
how these protestant claims of fundamental law integrate and engage 
with the Constitution as a transgenerational project. As we saw with 
Douglass, there is a rich tradition of emancipatory protestantism in the 
history of Black constitutional thought. Emancipatory protestantism 
makes it possible for the citizen interpreter to cleave between the 
alienating institutions of White Supremacy and the true meaning of the 
Constitution, which condemns those institutions even as they persist as 
a matter of positive law.143 Claiming the Constitution then becomes a 
kind of radical self-inclusion, where the claimant identifies herself as a 
member of the political community constituted by We the People. 
#BlackLivesMatter is one instance of emancipatory protestantism 
aimed at constitutional justice, one that emerges from the fertile soil 
and traditions of Black constitutional thought. 
I return one final time to the mural in my old Brooklyn 
neighborhood that depicts this heritage of emancipatory protestantism 
throughout the twentieth century of Black constitutional thought. 
Together, the stories it invokes demonstrate how interpretive claims 
develop over time, how they are constructed and received. Each of the 
figures in the mural, Paul Robeson, Thurgood Marshall, and Bruce 
Wright, all made protestant claims on the Constitution, just like 
Douglass before them.144 By claiming the Constitution for their own, 
these figures and every citizen who follows their example (including 
the young artist who set paint to the wall) bring their Constitution 
closer—perhaps as close as possible, short of Jefferson’s suggestion of 
a new Constitution every generation145—to the ideal of fundamental 
law that is self-given.146  
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Consider the story of Judge Bruce Wright. As a judge in New York 
criminal court in the 1970s, Wright became the target of the 
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, which memorably labeled him 
“Turn ‘em Loose Bruce” for his liberal approach to setting low bail for 
poor and black defendants. Judge Wright also publicly decried police 
violence, noting that acquittals gave police “a license to hunt down 
blacks and kill them with impunity.”147 In his memoir, Black Robes, 
White Justice, Wright reflects on the backlash that led to his 
reassignment in 1974, self-consciously embracing Douglass’s justice-
infused protestantism. 
So fearful and alarmed has the populace become that at 
the process of arraignment, when a defendant is merely 
charged with a crime, society lusts for his blood and 
applauds his capture only if bail is set at an impossible 
and inflationary figure. They cheer the violation of the 
very Constitution which they say is endangered . . . . 
[W]hen the [Eighth] Amendment says bail shall not be 
                                                                                                                   
friendship,” even among citizens with competing and divergent conceptions of a 
good life. A public conception of justice permits free and equal citizens to 
pursue their chosen ends under terms of cooperation that each can justify to the 
others, thereby “constituting the fundamental charter of a well-ordered human 
association.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 5, 397 (rev. ed., 1999). Rawls 
notes that “[n]o society can, of course, be a scheme of cooperation which men 
enter voluntarily in a literal sense; each person finds himself placed at birth in 
some particular position . . . [that] materially affects his life prospects.” Id. at 12. 
The only way to reconcile this inevitable fact with the liberal ideals of freedom 
and equality is to ensure that our shared institutions pass a high bar of 
justification—according to principles that rational parties would choose in an 
ideal situation designed to model the freedom and equality of moral personhood. 
As a result, “whenever social institutions satisfy these principles those engaged 
in them can say to one another that they are cooperating on terms to which they 
would agree if they were free and equal persons whose relations with respect to 
one another were fair.” Id. (emphasis added). By establishing the conditions for 
this sort of justificatory web, “a society satisfying the principles of justice as 
fairness comes as close as a society can to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets 
the principles which free and equal persons would assent to under circumstances 
that are fair. In this sense its members are autonomous and the obligations they 
recognize self-imposed.” Id. 
147 Robert D. McFadden, Bruce McM. Wright, Erudite Judge Whose Bail Rulings 
Caused an Uproar, Dies at 86, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2005), 
www.nytimes.com/2005/03/26/nyregion/bruce-mcm-wright-erudite-judge-
whose-bail-rulings-caused-an-uproar.html [http://perma.cc/9VC4-NJFR]. 
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excessive, it means that it must be reasonable. What is 
reasonable for a person who has two dollars?148 
Judge Wright would later defend his exercise of emancipatory 
protestantism as stemming from his obligation to “honor the 
admonition of the last will and testament of Frederick Douglass, which 
was to all black people of this country: Agitate, agitate, agitate. And I 
don’t think that my right to agitate stops at the courthouse door.”149 
We can also see Wright’s protestantism at work in his barbed response 
to colleagues who recalled military segregation as “national policy” 
during the War: “[t]hey were wrong of course. National policy was 
declared by the Constitution and its amendments. What they meant 
was that it was a national practice of raw racism and a heedless 
flaunting of the Constitution.”150 
My point is not necessarily to hold up Judge Wright as a paragon 
of the judicial office, though I would praise both his actions and his 
trenchant criticisms of the criminal justice system.151 My claim, rather, 
is that this line of emancipatory protestantism—which runs from 
Douglass, through Robeson, Marshall, and Wright, to today’s Black 
Lives Matter activists—dissolves the puzzle I alluded to at the start of 
this Article. Emancipatory protestantism explains how black citizens 
may rightly claim the fundamental law of the Constitution as their 
own, even as the institutions of White Supremacy persist under 
positive law. 
Emancipatory protestantism also provides the mechanism for how 
constitutional claims shift in plausibility across time, from one 
generation to the next.152 Notice that, although Judge Wright’s words 
were quite inflammatory in 1979, drawing criticism from both parties, 
the Democratic Party has largely come to accept his positions. And 
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they have done so rather recently, at the behest of activists proclaiming 
the value of Black lives. The mural of the Preamble depicts an 
interpretive conversation across the twentieth century.153 We should 
bear in mind, after all, that Douglass’s antebellum emancipatory 
protestantism was not successful—but a Civil War and Reconstruction 
charted a path toward his broad reading of the Preamble.154 
Most importantly, the mural conveys a message that this 
conversation is predicated upon and that sustains it: The Constitution is 
ours, too. “We the People” includes us, as well. We belong. 
B. Principles of Fundamental Law and the Constitutional 
Bases of Respect 
This discussion brings us to an objection: given its institutional 
legacy of injustice, subordination, and white supremacy, why should 
                                                 
153 This includes Paul Robeson’s claims on the Constitution. See his writings as a 
student at Rutgers (including his professor’s dismissive rejection of a breathless 
reading of the Equal Protection Clause) in PAUL ROBESON SPEAKS, supra note 3. 
154 See Moore, supra note 119. Certainly, that war and those formal amendments 
were not sufficient to secure Black citizens’ substantive equality. But the mural 
speaks to that arc of the story as well. For an illustrative discussion, compare 
Alfred Brophy on “The Great Constitutional Dreambook” in Ralph Ellison’s 
THE INVISIBLE MAN (1952), which stands in for Black citizens’ faith in 
constitutional redemption during the Jim Crow era. See Alfred Brophy, The 
Great Constitutional Dream Book, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 360 (2008). In Ellison’s novel, the narrator observes an 
elderly black couple being evicted from their Harlem apartment. We see markers 
of their emancipation and with the narrator’s repeated refrain that “we’re a law 
abiding people,” we see the empty promises of the post-bellum legal order laid 
bare. All the couple has is “The Great Constitutional Dream Book.” Brophy 
writes that “Ellison was alluding to ‘dream books,’ which in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries were popular in African-American culture for 
dream interpretation. The ‘Great Constitutional Dream Book’—for Ellison, and 
for African Americans during the years between the end of Reconstruction in 
1877 and the beginning of the civil rights movement, around the time of the 
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954)—was an image, 
an idea. It alluded to the dreams of what the Constitution might be and the life 
that might exist under it. . . . A constellation of ideas then in circulation in the 
black press, on how the legal world ought to be construed, constituted that 
dream book. Ellison was referring to the dreams of African-American 
intellectuals generally—about equality, the campaign to stop lynching, equal 
funding for separate schools, an end to discrimination in housing, the right to 
vote, and segregation in public transportation. Those dreams became a 
movement to place the idea of equality at the center of U.S. constitutional law.” 
Id. at 360. 
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we care about what the Constitution says, or even what it means? To 
be sure, constitutional inclusion is an important value—but shouldn’t 
we instead give conceptual priority to what justice requires? One 
might be tempted to read the Movement for Black Lives’ Vision, with 
its broad indictment of American institutions, in exactly that way.155 
But this choice as presented, between constitutional fidelity and 
justice, is a false one. A more searching theoretical approach will 
deliver a deep connection between the Citizens’ Constitution, citizens’ 
interpretive participation, and an essential element of social justice: the 
institutional grounding for citizens’ self-respect. 
There is a distinctive participatory value in citizens’ engagement 
with constitutional meaning. Adopting the standpoint of constitutional 
citizenship and the interpretive perspective provides a democratic-
republican basis for deliberating about what justice requires—together, 
as citizen-interpreters, whose arguments are grounded in shared 
principles of fundamental law. In particular, citizens’ common 
participation in constitutional interpretation gives rise to what I will 
call the constitutional bases of respect.156 
There are two aspects to the constitutional bases of respect. They 
consist in both (1) mutual recognition of fellow citizens’ equal status 
through the deliberative process of ongoing interpretive argument 
about basic principles, as well as (2) the institutional foundations of 
citizens’ self-respect in light of a society’s “constitutional 
essentials.”157 
We can look to an element of John Rawls’s theory of justice as an 
illustration of how basic institutional structures and the values they 
promote can give rise to (or undermine) citizens’ self-respect and their 
mutual respect for one another under those shared institutions. 
Rawls argues that the principles of a just society are those that 
would be chosen in a thought experiment he calls the “original 
position,” which is designed to model citizens’ free and equal status.158 
The parties to the original position select the principles of justice from 
behind a “veil of ignorance”: they know, for example, that they have a 
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capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity to form, revise, and 
pursue a “conception of the good”—and, indeed, these two capacities 
give rise to “fundamental aims and interests in the name of which they 
think it legitimate . . . to make claims on one another.” 159  But, 
importantly, they don’t know much else. They especially do not know 
their particular conception of what is valuable in life—only that it will 
be of the utmost importance to them.160 The parties also do not know 
other morally arbitrary features of their lives, such as their race, 
gender, talents, etc.161 
Facing this set of choice conditions, Rawls argues that the parties 
will seek to determine principles for the fair division of what he calls 
“primary social goods”—the sort of all-purpose means that would be 
rational to pursue no matter what particular conception of a good life 
one might turn out to have, and also which can be suitably governed 
by principles of distributive justice. 162  Income, wealth, access to 
offices and opportunities—whatever goals and projects you might 
pursue with your life, these are the all-purpose means that will prove 
instrumental.163 
Of these various goods, “perhaps the main” or “most important” 
primary good to a theory of distributive justice is “the social bases” of 
“self-respect.”164 Rawls says that “[i]t is clearly rational for [moral 
persons] to secure their self-respect. A sense of their own worth is 
necessary if they are to pursue their conception of the good with 
satisfaction and to take pleasure in its fulfillment. Self-respect is not so 
much a part of any rational plan of life as the sense that one’s plan is 
worth carrying out”165—a sense that is palpable from the shape of our 
shared institutions and how they order our social world. A theory of 
justice concerns itself with the social bases of self-respect because 
when social institutions are governed by principles of justice, they 
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thereby express citizens’ common respect for one another. Under such 
conditions, 
in public life citizens respect one another’s ends and 
adjudicate their political claims in ways that also 
support their self-esteem. It is precisely this background 
condition that is maintained by the principles of 
justice. . . . This democracy in judging each others’ 
aims is the foundation of self-respect in a well-ordered 
society.166 
We can observe this promise of just institutions most concretely in 
cases of constitutional injustice. Take, for example, Chief Justice 
Taney’s haunting words in Dred Scott, claiming a racialized 
constitutional inheritance that rendered white Europeans the sole 
members of our political community, to the exclusion of African 
slaves and their descendants: 
The question is simply this: Can a negro whose 
ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as 
slaves, become a member of the political community 
formed and brought into existence by the Constitution 
of the United States, and as such become entitled to all 
the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied 
by that instrument to the citizen? One of which rights is 
the privilege of suing in a court of the United States in 
the cases specified in the Constitution.  
  . . . . 
They had for more than a century before been regarded 
as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to 
associate with the white race, either in social or 
political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no 
rights which the white man was bound to respect; and 
that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to 
slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and 
treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and 
traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. This 
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opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the 
civilized portion of the white race.167 
With such a conception of our constitutional essentials, Taney literally 
makes it impossible for people of color to imagine themselves as 
political equals—so much so that Dred Scott’s suit must be dismissed 
for lack of standing by dint of the fact that he was born a slave, 
without regard to any other achievement or occurrence in his 
misfortunate life (such as the fact that he lived for years on free soil, 
was married and bore children there). 168  Dred Scott unmistakably 
envisions our shared institutions as designed to subordinate and 
degrade, not to express persons’ respect for one another. 
Or consider Dr. King’s response to the failures of Reconstruction, 
in his famous missive from a Birmingham jail—especially his 
impatience with white moderates’ plea for civil rights activists to 
“wait”: 
[W]hen you have seen vicious mobs lynch your mothers 
and fathers at will and drown your sisters and brothers 
at whim; when you have seen hate-filled policemen 
curse, kick, brutalize and even kill your black brothers 
and sisters with impunity; when you see the vast 
majority of your twenty million Negro brothers 
smothering in an air-tight cage of poverty in the midst 
of an affluent society; when you suddenly find your 
tongue twisted and your speech stammering as you seek 
to explain to your six-year-old daughter why she can’t 
go to the public amusement park that has just been 
advertised on television, and see tears welling up in her 
little eyes when she is told that Funtown is closed to 
colored children, and see the depressing clouds of 
inferiority begin to form in her little mental sky . . . . 
then you will understand why we find it difficult to 
wait.169 
This daunting description of institutional alienation and humiliation 
sits in stark contrast with Rawls’s discussion of the possibility for a 
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scheme of equal constitutional liberty to serve as the basis of citizens’ 
respect: 
The account of self-respect as perhaps the main 
primary good has stressed the great significance of how 
we think others value us. But in a well-ordered society 
[i.e., one governed by principles of justice] the need for 
status is met by the public recognition of just 
institutions, together with the full and diverse internal 
life of the many free communities of interests that the 
equal liberties allow. The basis for self-respect in a just 
society is not then one’s income share but the publicly 
affirmed distribution of fundamental rights and 
liberties. And this distribution being equal, everyone 
has a similar and secure status when they meet to 
conduct the common affairs of the wider society. No 
one is inclined to look beyond the constitutional 
affirmation of equality for further political ways of 
securing his status.170 
The point is to illustrate a theoretically rich notion of constitutional 
essentials as a shared basis of respect for ourselves and our fellow 
citizens—one that seems consistent with at least the text of the 
Constitution—and to notice the considerable gap between that promise 
                                                 
170 RAWLS, supra note 146, at 477. Note that this also occurs in the background of 
other just institutions, such as the fair value of political liberties (forbidding 
distortions of political equality based on disparities of income or wealth), fair 
equality of opportunity (so that one’s initial starting point in society has 
absolutely no correlation with their potential to succeed—only their level of 
talent), and the difference principle (so that any disparities in the level of talents 
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liberties, persons express their respect for one another in the very constitution of 
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do.” Id. This is Rawls’s strongest argument for why the parties to the original 
position would select the difference principle, rather than maximizing the 
average utility of members of society. 
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and the historical reality in which we find ourselves. But this gap 
creates a distinctive opportunity for citizens who adopt the 
constitutional point of view. Where this gap exists between abstract 
constitutional provisions that seem to invite justice and substantive 
equality—such as the Preamble and the Reconstruction 
Amendments—and the groan of subordinating institutions that 
continue to reject those values, emancipatory protestantism makes it 
possible for citizens (both in their individual capacities and when they 
carry out their constitutional role responsibilities) to reclaim and 
redeem the promise of those provisions.171 The arc of constitutional 
progress, as it were, can bend towards justice—because citizens 
choose to make it that way. 
This is the redemptive promise of emancipatory protestantism. 
With a legacy of injustice and a justice-seeking Constitution, citizens 
may take it upon themselves to occupy that gap and, bit by bit, restore 
the constitutional bases of respect—reclaiming the meaning of abstract 
provisions and layering on content-supplying mediating principles like 
“Black Lives Matter.” This is precisely what Douglass is doing in his 
reading of the Preamble.172 And Rawls very much has King in mind in 
his discussion of civil disobedience when constitutional principles aim 
at justice but institutions fall short. 173  When such disobedience 
satisfies certain conditions—that it is public, open, accepting of 
punishment, and most of all, directed as an appeal to shared principles 
of constitutional justice—it promotes what Rawls would later call 
“stability for the right reasons.”174 Citizen-disobedients thereby take 
responsibility for their Constitution and its principles, imbuing its 
meaning with their conception of justice and thereby affirming their 
own worth through their interpretive participation: 
In a democratic society, then, it is recognized that each 
citizen is responsible for his interpretation of the 
principles of justice and for his conduct in the light of 
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172 DOUGLASS, supra note 120, at 380, 387.  
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them. There can be no legal or socially approved 
rendering of these principles that we are always 
morally bound to accept, not even when it is given by a 
supreme court or legislature. Indeed, each 
constitutional agency, the legislature, the executive, 
and the court, puts forward its interpretation of the 
constitution and the political ideals that inform it. 
Although the court may have the last say in settling any 
particular case, it is not immune from powerful 
political influences that may force a revision of its 
reading of the constitution. The court presents its 
doctrine by reason and argument; its conception of the 
constitution must, if it is to endure, persuade the major 
part of the citizens of its soundness. The final court of 
appeal is not the court, nor the executive or the 
legislature, but the electorate as a whole. The civilly 
disobedient appeal in a special way to this body.175 
In this way we see how taking up the standpoint of constitutional 
citizenship provides a democratic basis for deliberating about justice, 
together. The Citizens’ Constitution provides the foundation for 
recognizing one another as equal citizens and considering our fellow 
interpreters’ arguments with respect—even amidst deep disagreement. 
And it supplies the grounds for what emerges to serve as the basis of 
each citizen contributor’s self-respect. The claim that “Black Lives 
Matter,” as an instance of emancipatory protestantism and as a claim 
of fundamental law, plays this role. 
C. The Problem of Illiberal Constitutional Extremities 
Institutional acceptance that “Black Lives Matter” then carries with 
it a necessary implication—the imperative to excise the constitutional 
impurity of White Supremacy like the dross from refined metal.176 By 
rejecting the degradation of White Supremacy, institutional 
recognition of “Black Lives Matter” as a claim of fundamental law 
thereby promotes the constitutional bases of respect. 
But another objection quickly comes into view. The agents of 
White Supremacy, long before Chief Justice Taney and long into 
subsequent centuries, have also laid claim to the Constitution. A recent 
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article by Jared Goldstein traces the history of “The Klan’s 
Constitution” and finds that the KKK, in its various iterations, “has 
consistently been guided by the conviction that the United States is 
fundamentally a white nation, that the nation’s founders were 
dedicated to white rule, and that the Constitution should be understood 
as the source of white power.” 177  The strongest version of these 
interpretive positions certainly represents an instance of what we 
might call “constitutional extremities”—but Goldstein shows that its 
currents have also coursed through institutional enactments that are far 
closer to the mainstream. These examples range from Taney’s 
appalling claims in Dred Scott, 178  to the nativism that underlay 
immigration restrictions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries,179 to the forces that eroded Reconstruction and promoted 
Jim Crow for a century.180 The problem is this: how can “Black Lives 
Matter” operate as a claim of fundamental constitutional law if our 
founding document also seems (at least according to some interpreters) 
to countenance its constitutional antipode, a legacy of White 
Supremacy? 
One way to respond to the objection is to flatly deny the premise 
and refuse to give any credence to “the Klan’s Constitution.” Perhaps 
people have held those interpretive views, but people believe all kinds 
of crazy things—and in this case, at least, they are mistaken. Frederick 
Douglass was correct about the founding Constitution’s antiracist tilt, 
which the Reconstruction Amendments—the re-founding texts of our 
Constitution, today—and the victories of the Civil Rights Movement 
serve to confirm.181 
But this response rescues “Black Lives Matter” as a constitutional 
claim at the expense of the theoretical and normative foundations of 
fundamental law. Doesn’t the interpretive prospect of illiberal 
constitutional extremities, which reject constitutional inclusion at their 
core, undermine the very notion of the constitutional bases of respect? 
How can the Constitution ground citizens’ mutual respect and 
                                                 
177 Jared A. Goldstein, The Klan’s Constitution (Roger Williams Sch. of Law Legal 
Studies, Working Paper No. 179, 2018) (abstract). 
178 DOUGLASS, supra note 120, at 381; Goldstein, supra note 177, at 4. 
179 Goldstein, supra note 177, at 5. 
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181 See supra discussion accompanying notes 77-81, 98-111. 
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recognition in the face of such deep and rending disagreement? A 
more satisfactory response must press further. 
Still, we needn’t stray too far from that line of argument—we 
should not lose sight of the fact that the Klan is, after all, very much 
mistaken about the best interpretation of constitutional values. Even 
against the background churn of principles of fundamental law, some 
things are settled. Among them is the outcome of our “great civil war,” 
which, as the President who oversaw its course once said, tested 
whether “a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the 
proposition that all men are created equal[,] . . . can long endure.”182 
Also settled are the constitutional landmarks of Brown v. Board of 
Education,183 the Civil Rights Act of 1964,184 and the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965185—which emerged from the movements of the twentieth 
century and breathed life into that war’s “new birth of freedom.”186 
It is no coincidence that, in Goldstein’s recitation of the Klan’s 
different episodes of constitutional thought, White Supremacists so 
frequently place themselves on the wrong side of history. Klan 
members such as Nathan Bedford Forrest praised “the old 
Constitution” of 1861, willfully repudiating the legitimacy of its 
subsequent amendments—but such wistful romanticism does not 
change the outcome of those struggles, now written on the face of our 
institutions. William Simmons, who formed the second Klan with its 
surge of nativism, testified before Congress in 1921 that the 
organization was “assembled around the Constitution of the United 
States, to safeguard its provisions, advance its purposes, and 
perpetuate its democracy.”187 Such a view, of course, is plausible only 
if one denies that the Constitution purports to secure the equal 
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citizenship of the descendants of emancipated slaves, as full members 
of the democratic polity. Perhaps the Klan might squint and blur such 
an omission during the height of Jim Crow, with Reconstruction a 
relegated memory—but as we have observed, the story does not end 
there. The second Klan could embrace constitutional values 
(“[d]emocracy, fair-dealing, impartial justice, equal opportunity, 
religious liberty, independence, self-reliance, courage, endurance, 
[and] acceptance of individual responsibility”) 188  as “uniquely the 
product of Anglo-Saxon culture” and which “could only truly be 
embraced by white Protestants.” 189  But, as Goldstein notes, this 
cultural chauvinism led ineluctably to an even more dubious 
assertion—that White Supremacy is the core constitutional value.190 
Frederick Douglass has already explained to us why this insertion of 
iniquity into the document is such a spurious displacement of 
constitutional text and history.191 
To the extent that constitutional extremities like the Klan’s invoke 
more overlapping constitutional values, this is a welcome 
occurrence—it serves to better ground our deepest disagreements as a 
nation and generate common argumentative resources. More 
importantly, liberal constitutional values and the arc of their 
development exert an ongoing force on interpretive argumentation. 
Goldstein documents the increasing “Nazi-fication” of the Klan over 
the latter half of the twentieth century, turning away from 
constitutional patriotism towards a revolutionary stance and radical 
ethno-nationalism—one that rejects Lincoln’s “notion of a 
‘proposition nation.’” 192  If we set this course against the broader 
backdrop of constitutional development, we can observe the 
centripetal force repelling the Klan and its commitment to White 
Supremacy away from prevailing views about what the Constitution 
means. As the Klan became increasingly marginalized (even the object 
of cultural ridicule) in the 1970s and beyond, it is hardly a coincidence 
that its interpretive constitutional resources grew depleted.193 
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Again, we see a similar thread of argument against the Klan’s 
interpretive claims, which reach for the Constitution but are repelled 
by its liberal and egalitarian commitments.194 So too with all illiberal 
views that occupy constitutional extremities—they might well 
encounter the same refrain, invoking Brown, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and other bits of positive law: “It’s been decided already! 
The Constitution rejects your illiberal commitments.” But isn’t this an 
odd refrain for the protestant view I have described, where 
constitutional meaning is not determined by authoritative institutions, 
but rather at the tribunal of each citizens’ individual reason, as they 
deliberate together about what their Constitution means?195 
And here we arrive at the key point, which allows us to vault 
through the problem of illiberal constitutional extremities and secure 
the theoretical basis for fundamental law. What matters about Brown 
and the Fourteenth Amendment as guarantees of equal citizenship—
the reason why the Klan gets the Constitution so wrong—is not the 
mere fact of positive legal authority. It’s true that on a Monday 
morning in May of 1954, nine judges in black robes decided that 
districts in Kansas, South Carolina, Delaware, Virginia, and the 
District of Columbia could no longer segregate schools based on 
race.196 And it’s also true that they did so because, eighty-six years 
prior, Congress proposed, and the states ratified, a constitutional 
amendment forbidding states to “deny to any person . . . equal 
protection of the laws.”197 Facts like these, about the past actions of 
government officials and words on the page, are obviously important 
in determining constitutional meaning. But they matter less than—or, 
better, they take on their particular salience and importance because 
of—a more basic fact: widespread acceptance, across generations of 
citizens, that these constitutional landmarks and their animating 
principle of equal citizenship are central to the Constitution. The core 
constitutional value of equality permeates the fabric of citizens’ 
common reason. 
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D. From Fundamental Law to Ordinary Law: The Legal 
Stakes 
A final question remains. If we understand the claim that “Black 
Lives Matter” as a claim of fundamental law, how does it translate to 
actual changes in ordinary law and legal doctrine? 
One place to look, of course, are the demands from the voices of 
the movement itself. The Movement for Black Lives’ “Vision” calls 
for “an end to the war against Black people,” “investment-divestment” 
of resources away from incarceration and towards restoring 
communities, reparations for the enduring harms of chattel slavery, 
economic justice, and increased black political power. 198  Certainly 
these are worthy goals, and recognizing “Black Lives Matter” as a 
claim of fundamental constitutional law underscores the extent to 
which American society is deeply committed to these sorts of steps to 
rectify the lasting legacy of White Supremacy. And they amount to 
important concrete intermediate steps—from an end to capital 
punishment, sweeping transformation of bail practices, increased 
decarceration and decriminalization, even movement towards the 
abolition of the prison system.199 
But there are also consequences from the claim that “Black Lives 
Matter” that flow from the aspirations of fundamental law to the gritty 
details of ordinary law and doctrine. In the remainder of this section, I 
will sketch several concrete examples of how the claim that “Black 
Lives Matter” applied as a mediating principle for these and other 
related constitutional provisions, might alter particular institutions and 
outcomes. 
 The Law of Immunity and Jury Control: Which claims can 
even reach a jury? 
The Supreme Court’s conjoint doctrines of qualified immunity 
under § 1983 (limiting officers’ liability for civil rights violations that 
are not “clearly established”) and summary judgment (disposing of 
cases where no reasonable jury could find a dispute of material fact) 
make for a devastating combination against civil rights plaintiffs who 
have suffered excessive force at the hands of the state.200 In such cases, 
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this doctrinal confluence keeps mixed question of fact and law—i.e., 
reasonableness—away from juries who might be well suited to 
appreciate the plaintiffs’ claims.201 It is vital that the jury should hear 
these cases, make such mixed inquiries, and deliberate together about 
the relevant principles that will decide what is reasonable under the 
circumstances.202 
On the night of March 29, 2001, a Deputy Sheriff in Peachtree 
City, Georgia attempted a routine traffic stop.203 Victor Harris was 
driving 73 miles per hour on a 55-mile-per-hour four-lane highway.204 
Upon seeing the blue lights flash behind him, Harris accelerated 
further. The Deputy gave pursuit, commencing a chase that would 
reach speeds of up to 85 miles per hour.205 Harris attempted a failed 
maneuver to evade capture by diverting into an empty parking lot.206 
As Harris reentered the highway, Deputy Timothy Scott took the lead 
in pursuit.207 Approximately six minutes after the chase had begun, 
Scott deliberately struck Harris’s rear bumper, causing Harris’s car to 
spin out of control and overturn into a nearby embankment.208 As a 
result of the crash, Harris lost the use of his arms and legs.209 Harris 
filed a § 1983 claim, arguing that Scott’s use of deadly force was an 
unreasonable seizure of his person, violating his rights under the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.210 
Scott moved for summary judgment, a procedure that essentially 
cuts out the jury’s fact-finding phase of a trial.211 Federal courts will 
only grant a motion for summary judgment when “there is no genuine 
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dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law,”212 so that “a reasonable jury would not have a 
legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the other party.”213 Scott 
claimed to prevail as a matter of law because he had qualified 
immunity: Harris had no clearly established right against the use of 
deadly force in a high-speed chase like this one. 214  Although the 
Supreme Court’s twenty-two-year-old precedent 215  established the 
relevant factors for the use of deadly force216, Scott sought a clear rule 
exempting high-speed chases from that inquiry.217 If Scott was correct, 
and Harris did not have a clearly-established right against deadly 
force, then Scott would be immune against any liability. The jury’s 
findings would no longer decide any dispute over a material fact, and 
Scott should then win the case on a motion for summary judgment, as 
a matter of law. 
Because summary judgment short-circuits a jury trial, courts will 
draw any factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party and ask 
whether a reasonable jury could still find in its favor.218 If, even then, 
no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, then granting 
summary judgment will not impair the right to a civil jury trial.219 
Here, both the District Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals denied Scott’s motion.220  Harris alleged several key facts, 
including precautions that he took to avoid any harm and the lack of 
danger to other drivers.221 If a jury were to find those facts, under the 
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Court’s prevailing precedent, they could also reasonably find for 
Harris. The lower courts reasoned, therefore, that Scott should not be 
able to circumvent the jury.222 
But the Supreme Court reversed—and not just because of how the 
lower courts applied the law, but also because of what the Justices 
saw. “There is,” Justice Scalia writes for an 8-1 majority, “an added 
wrinkle in this case: existence in the record of a videotape capturing 
the events in question.”223 Granting the motion for summary judgment, 
Scalia recounts that “the video more closely resembles a Hollywood-
style car chase of the most frightening sort, placing police officers and 
innocent bystanders alike at great risk of serious injury. . . . [Harris’s] 
version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no 
reasonable jury could have believed him.”224 
Justice John Paul Stevens, the lone dissenter, concludes instead 
that “the tape actually confirms, rather than contradicts, the lower 
courts’ appraisal of the factual questions at issue.”225 On his viewing, 
Justice Stevens doubts that Harris’s initial speeding violation and 
attempts at evasion posed enough of an immediate threat to justify 
deadly force (as opposed to arresting him later, as soon as the next 
morning). 226  He notes that the other vehicles involved either had 
pulled over to the right-hand shoulder, as they would yield to an 
ambulance with sirens similarly blaring, or were safely in the opposite 
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lane.227 Most importantly, Justice Stevens objects to the Court’s de 
novo review of the record in the guise of deciding a question of law.228 
The tape, whatever its contents, “surely does not provide a principled 
basis for depriving [Harris] of his right to have a jury evaluate the 
question whether the police officers’ decision to use deadly force to 
bring the chase to an end was reasonable.”229 Justice Scalia’s response 
doubles down on the unambiguous contents of the tape. Providing a 
link to what is perhaps the Court’s most noteworthy multimedia 
opinion, he concludes: “We are happy to allow the videotape to speak 
for itself.”230 (I invite the reader to take a look as well.) 
A recent study by Dan Kahan provides stronger empirical grounds 
for such skepticism.231 After showing the video to a sample of 1,350 
viewers, the majority of participants in the study agreed with the 
Court’s take,232 that Harris posed a significant danger and that Scott’s 
actions were reasonable. 233  But the distribution of disagreement, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, was far from uniform. “African Americans, 
low-income workers, and residents of the Northeast, for example, 
tended to form more pro-plaintiff views of the facts than did the Court. 
So did individuals who characterized themselves as liberals and 
Democrats.” 234  These groups “tended to perceive less danger in 
Harris’s flight, to attribute more responsibility to the police for 
creating the risk for the public, and to find less justification in the use 
of deadly force to end the chase.”235 A jury of twelve citizens that was 
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at least partially composed of members of these groups, if those jurors 
determined that deadly force was not justified, would have to arrive at 
a general verdict through deliberation.236  
We cannot say, with such stark empirical evidence of dissensus, 
that any juror who views the tape favorably to Harris is, on that basis, 
unreasonable.237 Nor can we predict that, when the jurors exchange 
their arguments and perspectives through the process of deliberation, 
these views will tilt one way or the other. The tape plainly does not 
speak for itself—a genuine dispute of material fact remains, and 
summary judgment against Harris is improper. 
Whether Scott acted reasonably under the circumstances is a mixed 
question of law and fact, as is the case for any question of 
negligence.238 But we might understand Scalia to offer a new rule of 
law: that the use of deadly force in high-speed pursuit is per se 
justified, never unreasonable. But the Court does not state its holding 
in such a way, and Justices Ginsberg and Breyer disclaim it explicitly 
in their concurrences. 239  Even if the Court had announced such a 
categorical rule of law (keeping these sorts of cases away from juries), 
it would not be sound.240 As the majority itself notes,241 the relative 
balance of factors that are unquestionably relevant—population 
density, time of day, weather conditions, the dangerousness of the 
offense—would seem to depend quite heavily on the particular facts 
and resist any categorical rule. To use Justice Stevens’s compelling 
example, a car chase through the Nevada desert is worlds apart from 
one that proceeds through busy downtown Las Vegas.242 The question 
of what is reasonable under the circumstances, unsurprisingly, is 
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particular to those circumstances.243 It is a mixed question of law and 
fact. 
But there is a more fundamental point: that the jury has a crucial 
role to play in determining these sorts of mixed questions of law and 
fact, especially on the interpretive question of constitutional 
reasonableness. Citizen-jurors are in the best position to make that 
particularized judgment, rather than judges. Certainly, this sort of 
question is within their competence. The law presupposes jurors’ 
capacity to render particularized applications of accessible principles 
(e.g., negligence) and community norms, drawing on local knowledge. 
A mountain of evidence confirms it.244 The key point, however, is that 
the jury’s interpretive responsibility is especially valuable in the 
constitutional domain, for cases of express constitutional application. 
First, is the distinctive value of group deliberation within the jury. 
In the corpus of cases in the Chicago Jury Project, Kalven and Zeisel 
found that nine out of every ten verdicts ultimately tipped in the same 
direction as the initial majoritarian vote.245 This finding cuts against 
the notion that isolated and obstreperous holdouts can force a hung 
jury.246 But it also suggests, as Abramson rightly points out, that in the 
remaining tenth of cases the minority is able to persuade the 
majority.247 These were “likely to be cases where the minority did 
have the stronger arguments and so were able to resist the normal tide 
of peer pressure. In these cases, the requirement of unanimity arguably 
permitted deliberation to continue long enough for reasoned argument 
to prevail over initial opinions.”248 This is especially true in mixed 
cases of constitutional law and fact, with their application of principles 
(such as “Black Lives Matter”) to particular facts. They must decide 
together what was reasonable under the circumstances, deliberating 
about what factors matter most in determining whether Officer Scott’s 
use of deadly force was excessive and why. 
                                                 
243 Id. at 382. 
244 See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966) (the locus 
classicus). 
245 Id. at 488. 
246 They suggest that it might take as many as three opposing votes (if not four or 
five) to generate this result. Id. at 462. See also ABRAMSON, supra note 236, at 
202. 
247 Id. at 197. 
248 Id. 
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Additionally, the distinctive value of the jury’s deliberative 
character comes into view when we combine it with a further value of 
inclusion. Though we are still far from its realization, the Court has 
clearly articulated the ideal of the jury as a “cross-section of the 
community,” easing discriminatory barriers to jury service based on 
race249 and gender.250 There is value not just in representing these 
different groups and identities, but also in encountering all these 
different perspectives and engaging with their various deliberative 
contributions.251 Powerful judges in black robes (even in plainclothes) 
interact with the police in a fundamentally different way than do many 
citizens. The social position that judges occupy252 and the remarkably 
homogenous life experience that leads them there253 largely shields 
judges from arbitrary, excessive, and even discriminatory policing.254 
Many citizens are not so lucky—and whether the results are tragic, 
                                                 
249 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 83, 97-98 (1986). 
250 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994). 
251 Abramson also favors the deliberative account of the jury’s inclusive value, in 
lieu of mere representativeness. See ABRAMSON, supra note 236, at 139-41. 
252 Article III District Court Judges receive an annual salary of $208,000. See 
Judicial Compensation, U.S. CTS., www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-compensation  [http://perma.cc/2WMF-5SSZ] (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2018). This amount places them well into the top decile of earners each 
year. See United States Household Income Brackets and Percentiles in 2018, 
U.S. CTS.,  https://dqydj.com/united-states-household-income-brackets-
percentiles/ [perma.cc/DE24-78MT] (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). And it is 
constitutionally guaranteed to continue (or increase) for the entire duration of 
their lives. See Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Advocates Higher Pay for 
Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/01/us/01scotus.html [perma.cc/C3E3-
MNMY]. For many, entering the judiciary brings a significant step down in their 
income from lucrative private practice. Id. 
253 See Broadening the Bench: Professional Diversity and Judicial Nominations, 
ALLIANCE FOR JUST. (Report), Mar. 18, 2016, at 5, available at  
https://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Professional-Diversity-
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8UQ-MA3P]. 
254 For a fictional contrast, we might consider the story of Judge Roberto Mendoza 
in The West Wing: Celestial Navigation (NBC television broadcast Feb. 16, 
2000), who is racially profiled and falsely arrested. Of course, the episode does 
not entirely dispel the notion that federal judges enjoy certain privilege. It ends 
with Mendoza’s release from jail, only after two of the President’s top aides 
browbeat a handful of hapless Connecticut state police into relinquishing their 
nominee to the Supreme Court. 
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endemic, or both, 255  their perspectives could certainly add to the 
determination of whether police conduct is “reasonable.” 
Taking seriously the notion that “Black Lives Matter” means that 
these perspectives ought to figure into deciding cases like Victor 
Harris’s. Studies from Kalven & Zeisel’s to Kahan et al. confirm that 
this perspective is present in the cross-section of lay jurors, and also 
that it could make a considerable difference in deliberations. But these 
voices cannot make a difference if judges deploy qualified immunity 
and summary judgment to prevent constitutional torts from reaching a 
jury, simply because they believe that they know better. 
 The Law of Jury Selection: Who gets to serve on the jury? 
Similarly, a recognition of the difference in the lived experience of 
black citizens and the reality of institutional subordination would 
underscore the importance of an inclusive and representative jury. 
Formal racial discrimination is barred under Strauder v. West Virginia, 
and Batson v. Kentucky bars the use of peremptory challenges if they 
are racially motivated.256 But these formal barriers are only somewhat 
effective against all but the most egregious instances of discrimination. 
The Court’s recent decision in Foster v. Chatman gives Batson more 
teeth, though its doctrinal impact remains to be seen.257 Studies show 
that presence of black jurors even in the pool reduces convictions.258 
But beyond that finding, there is a robust theoretical case that diversity 
and difference in the jury room brings distinctive benefits to bear on 
the deliberative process.259 
Citizen-jurors’ capacity to serve is directly linked to what I call the 
constitutional bases of respect—the oath and office of the juror 
empowers them to deliberate together with their fellow citizens, and it 
ensures that their voices are heard. And, symmetrically, if this 
                                                 
255 See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(“[I]t is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of this type of 
scrutiny.”). See also Judge Scheindlin’s factual findings for New York City’s 
“stop and frisk” policy in Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 
(2013). The City dropped its appeal after the election of Bill DeBlasio in 2013. 
256 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107-08 (1986). 
257 Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1741-42 (2016). 
258 See Shamena Anwar et al., The Impact of Jury Race in Criminal Trials, 127 Q. 
J. ECON. 1017, 1019 (2012). 
259 See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 
1177-78 (2005). 
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opportunity is denied on the basis of their race, citizens’ constitutional 
bases of respect fall to the predations of White Supremacy. Taking 
seriously the claim that “Black Lives Matter” means that we cannot 
countenance this violation, and it would substantively enhance the 
doctrine of Batson and Foster accordingly. 
 The Law of Standing: Who may bring what sorts of claims to 
be heard? 
In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,260 a black citizen sued the city of 
Los Angeles and certain police officials after having been put in a 
chokehold during a traffic stop. (This same maneuver, which is now 
officially banned in most jurisdictions, caused the death of Eric 
Garner). 261  After demonstrating a policy to routinely wield this 
technique in a way that brought significant harm, Lyons received 
several forms of relief from the lower courts.262 But the Supreme Court 
struck down the injunction that Lyons sought—an order forbidding 
police from using chokeholds in the future.263 A divided Court held 
that Lyons lacked standing for that particular remedy, because it was 
“no more than speculation to assert either that Lyons himself will 
again be involved in one of those unfortunate instances, or that he will 
be arrested in the future and provoke the use of a chokehold by 
resisting arrest, attempting to escape, or threatening deadly force or 
serious bodily injury.”264 But thirty years later and with clearer eyes, I 
believe we can see that the plaintiff and a similarly situated class of 
black citizens really are more likely to be put in a chokehold. And the 
arguments of the “Black Lives Matter” movement, if we accept them, 
explain why: a recognition of difference, a legacy of subordination, 
and emancipatory protestantism on the part of the plaintiff challenging 
these constitutional injustices.265 
                                                 
260 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
261 See Benjamin Mueller, Review Board Recommends Stiffest Punishment for 
Officer in Garner Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/08/nyregion/eric-garner-chokehold-review-
board.html [https://perma.cc/Q5WB-FEHD]. 
262 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 98-99. 
263 Id. at 99-100. 
264 Id. at 108. 
265 This goes beyond simply taking judicial notice of facts—this goes to the 
substance of the claim. Cf. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 
YALE L.J. 221 (1988). 
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Most importantly, however, is the principle that “Black Lives 
Matter” should figure into the merits of all these cases, and more. It 
should be articulated and addressed in the deliberations of juries, the 
opinions of judges, and the hearts and minds of the citizenry. Together, 
as a people, we should take seriously the principle’s core 
components—its recognition of difference and a legacy of 
subordination, its promise of emancipatory protestantism. Not 
everyone will agree (much less take comfort) in what the claim that 
“Black Lives Matter” connotes. But we should all note that it strikes at 
the core of our Constitution. 
